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Overview: the G20 and long-term financing for investment, reforming 
international taxation, global energy governance, and fighting corruption 
 
Mike Callaghan1 
 
 
This issue of the Monitor deals with four topics: long-term financing for investment, 
combating tax evasion and avoidance, fighting corruption and global energy governance. 
Consistent with the approach taken in previous issues of the Monitor, the question explored 
within each topic is ‘how can the G20 add value?’ 
 
Long-term financing for investment and the G20 
 
There are three papers on this topic: from Stephen Grenville, Maria Monica Wihardja and 
Daniela Strube. All three concentrate on the issue of financing for infrastructure investment. 
 
Grenville and Wihardja’s papers were written prior to the St Petersburg summit on 5-6 
September 2013 and the associated release of the workplan prepared by the G20 Study Group 
on Financing for Investment.2 However, Grenville has written an addendum to his paper that 
provides a brief summary and comment on the outcomes from the St Petersburg summit. 
 
Importantly for Australia, leaders have outlined an agenda of issues to be pursued during 
Australia’s chairing of the G20 in 2014, including the implementation of various measures by 
the time of the Brisbane summit. For example, in St Petersburg, leaders agreed to: 
 
• identify and start to implement, by the Brisbane summit, a set of collective and 
country-specific actions that tangibly improve ‘our investment environment’; 
• identify, by the next summit, approaches to implementing the OECD’s High-level 
Principles of Long-term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors; 
• identify measures that will facilitate the development of domestic capital markets and 
improve the intermediation of global savings for productive long-term investments; 
and 
• give particular attention to ways of improving public-private partnership (PPP) 
arrangements. 
 
The key issue addressed by both Grenville and Strube is ‘how can the G20 add value in 
facilitating increased financing for infrastructure investment?’ Both authors observe that 
infrastructure investment is not a global public good, and that most of the steps required to 
improve the environment for infrastructure investment involve measures that lie within 
national decision making processes. In this context, as Strube notes, one role that the G20 can 
play is in advocating for appropriate domestic policy settings. This is consistent with the 
leaders’ commitment made in St Petersburg that G20 members develop country-specific 
measures for improving their respective investment climates by the time of the Brisbane 
summit.  
 
                                                          
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 G20. G20 workplan on financing for investment: study group's findings and ways foward. G20 Study Group on 
Financing for Investment, July 2013: http://en.g20russia.ru/news/20130906/782776427.html. 
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While the constraints and challenges of infrastructure financing are not principally global 
matters, sharing ‘best practice’ is something that the G20 can do, and in this regard the paper 
by Wihardja, which focuses on the infrastructure needs of Indonesia, provides a useful 
benchmark in terms of the needs of emerging markets and where the G20 may assist. As 
Wihardja notes, Indonesia is in dire need of infrastructure and needs help from its regional 
and global partners in furthering the debate on infrastructure development, in learning lessons 
from other successful countries and in receiving assistance so it can build up domestic 
capacity. Wihardja says that Indonesia needs external pressure that will galvanise reform.  
 
Strube make a similar point in her paper that the G20 can advocate for the adoption of 
infrastructure-friendly domestic policies.  In terms of taking forward the commitments made 
by leaders in St Petersburg, and in recognising that domestic policy settings are the main 
factor that influence a country’s investment environment, Strube suggests that infrastructure 
should be viewed as a ‘cross-cutting’ issue on the G20’s agenda, rather than as a separate 
work stream. As such, work on other policy issues, such as macroeconomic policy settings, 
financial regulation, climate change and reducing corruption, should explicitly consider the 
relevant implications of improving the environment for infrastructure investment. 
 
Grenville identifies a number of areas where international cooperation can assist 
infrastructure financing, such as building up greater cross-country uniformity to help reduce 
research and decision making costs, supporting the development of local bond markets, and 
by providing technical support, particularly through the multilateral development banks 
(MDBs). 
 
A particularly challenging task that leaders have set for themselves in 2014 is to improve the 
intermediation of global savings towards productive long-term investments. As Grenville and 
Strube point out, instead of capital flowing ‘up-hill’ from emerging markets to developed 
economies, there are benefits from connecting the surplus savings of developed countries 
with the high social-return infrastructure investment opportunities in emerging markets. 
While Grenville feels that reversing the ‘up-hill’ flow of capital from emerging to mature 
economies may be beyond the G20’s reach, it is nevertheless a challenge that the forum will 
have to confront in 2014. 
 
Reforming international taxation and the G20 
 
There are two papers on this topic: one by Marty Harris and myself and another by Philip 
Anderson. 
 
The progress made in combating tax evasion and tax avoidance was a major outcome of the 
St Petersburg summit. The G20’s focus has been on reducing tax evasion through greater tax 
transparency and the promotion of the automatic exchange of tax information, as well as on 
dealing with tax avoidance by responding to ‘base erosion and profit shifting’ (BEPS). 
 
The reform of international taxation is a complex and contentious issue. As both papers note, 
in many respects St Petersburg dealt with the easy parts – the endorsement of ‘High-level 
Principles’ to combat BEPS and an agreement that G20 members would aim to automatically 
exchange tax information by end-2015. However, Australia has the difficult task of ensuring 
that concrete progress is made on these commitments throughout 2014, if the deadline is to be 
met. And it is essential for the credibility of the G20 that this is the case. It would be 
extremely unfortunate if what is considered to be a major outcome from one summit is seen 
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to languish under the next G20 chair, thereby confirming concerns that the G20 fails to 
deliver and that as the chair rotates, the G20 embarks on a new set of priorities. Moreover, 
apart from the concern that governments have about revenue leakage, there are also equity 
considerations embedded within the failure of corporates to pay their fair share of tax, a 
matter that resonates with the public in all G20 countries. 
 
Harris and I propose that Australia, as G20 chair, advance the BEPS project in 2014 by 
focusing on the three areas: 
 
• First, focus on greater transparency, in particular, getting taxpayers in all G20 
countries to disclose more targeted information about their tax planning strategies. 
The drive for greater transparency should include disclosure of taxpayers’ beneficial 
ownerships, and a renewed effort should be made by all G20 members to commit to 
the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. Improved transparency is an area that 
can be advanced relatively quickly and does not require the negotiation of an 
international agreement.  
• Second, the work on BEPS should be placed in the broader context of the need for 
G20 members to adjust to a changing global business landscape. The core problem 
has been the failure of international tax laws to maintain pace with global and 
technological changes, particularly in the digital economy. The same changes are also 
impacting on trade policy, which has not adjusted to the rise of global value chains 
and the fact that goods are increasingly being made ‘in the world’ and not in any one 
country. Technological change will continue to occur. In 2014 the G20 should 
introduce a forward looking component to the process, where ministers and leaders 
reflect on the implications of likely future corporate and technological developments 
and what they mean for economic management and the importance of international 
cooperation. For example, Anderson’s paper notes the increasing challenge of 
imposing VAT/GST on cross border transactions that involve the digital supply of 
goods and services. 
• Third, it is important that the G20’s work on tax is seen as a global initiative and is 
particularly responsive to the needs of developing countries. Improving the domestic 
revenue raising capacity of low-income countries will have enormous implications in 
improving their development prospects. In 2014 there should be closer engagement 
between the G20 members and non-G20 members, particularly developing countries, 
on the BEPS project. 
 
Continuing with the theme that the G20 needs to respond to the changing international 
business landscape, Anderson notes in his paper the increasing challenge of imposing 
VAT/GST on cross border transactions that involve the digital supply of goods and services. 
Anderson also notes that the combined OECD and G20 membership represents only twenty 
per cent of countries in the world, quite small countries can play a major role when it comes 
to tax planning. Hence the interest of all countries needs to be taken into account if the 
proposed changes are to be effective.  
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The G20 and the fight against corruption  
 
Hugh Jorgensen’s paper offers a critical review of the G20’s work on anti-corruption. The 
context of the paper is that the mandate of the G20’s Anti-Corruption Working Group and the 
most recent G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan are set to expire in 2014, meaning that leaders 
at the Brisbane summit will have to decide whether to extend the current approach to 
combating corruption, or try something different.  
 
Many of the issues that Jorgensen discusses go to the heart of the operation of the G20 and 
where it can add value. As noted in the papers on long-term investment financing, one of the 
great advantages of the G20 is that participating leaders can give a political push to get things 
done. This has occurred in the work on anti-corruption, notably in encouraging countries to 
ratify the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the OECD’s Anti-
Bribery Convention. But Jorgensen notes that while corralling G20 members into ratifying an 
international convention is a valuable first step, the real test is getting countries to fulfil their 
obligations under that convention. To date, the weak point of the G20’s activities has been in 
closing the gap between commitments and implementation. In discussing which issues should 
be dealt with by leaders, Jorgensen points out that the detailed aspects of anti-corruption 
work should not be on the leaders’ agenda. However, the question that arises is that if a 
country is to take any given commitment seriously, might it be necessary for it to be directly 
considered by leaders? 
 
Another very relevant point that Jorgensen makes about the Anti-Corruption Working Group, 
which is applicable to all G20 working groups, is that there should not be an expectation that 
they are meant to last in perpetuity – their role and ongoing relevance should regularly be 
considered. Jorgensen concludes that while the G20 has brought value to the anti-corruption 
agenda, its ability to do so in the future will require leaders to push for a more specific and 
outcome-oriented set of objectives. 
 
Global energy governance and the G20  
 
Marty Harris and I also have a second paper that considers the role of the G20 in dealing with 
changes in the global energy market and the lack of institutional arrangements to deal with 
these changes. As we note, the problem is that international energy governance has not 
sufficiently adapted to the major changes that have been taking place in world energy 
markets, particularly: the emergence of major developing countries; changing relations 
between oil producers and consumers; and, climate change as a key energy policy issue. For 
example, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is the most prominent international energy 
body, but its membership is limited to OECD countries and is largely a consumer-oriented 
agency. Any reform of global energy governance will have to include the major energy 
exporting countries. 
 
Given that its membership includes both major energy producer and consumer countries, it 
has been argued that the G20 could play a direct role in coordinating the work of the various 
energy agencies and other international bodies working on related issues, such as the 
UNFCCC, IEA, World Bank, IAEA, Energy Charter Secretariat, WTO, OPEC, International 
Energy Forum, IPCC and others. However, as an informal political grouping without a 
secretariat, this would involve a level of engagement that goes beyond the G20’s existing 
structure. Nevertheless, we do conclude that the G20 is the only forum that has the political 
power or weight that could improve global energy governance. Moreover, consistent with 
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efforts to reform the governance arrangements in the international financial institutions, a 
central objective of the G20 should be to ensure that all global international economic 
institutions are adapting to a rapidly changing global economy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The issues covered in this Monitor are wide ranging, but they do raise similar issues in terms 
of where the G20 can add value. It is evident that one of the main roles that the G20 can play 
is to bring to bear the political weight of leaders in advancing an issue. But this is a power 
that has to be used in a targeted and selective way. For as we have seen, the fastest way for 
the G20 to lose credibility is for leaders to make a commitment that they then fail to 
implement. 
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Financing for infrastructure – what contribution can the G20 make? 
 
Stephen Grenville1 
 
 
Addendum 
 
The main text of this paper was drafted before the St Petersburg Leaders’ meeting. This 
addendum provides a brief summary of the outcomes of the St Petersburg meeting that relate 
to infrastructure. 
 
The St Petersburg G20 summit2 covered infrastructure-related issues under the agenda topic 
Financing for Investment, with leaders committing ‘to identify and start to implement by the 
Brisbane summit a set of collective and country-specific actions that tangibly improve our 
domestic investment environments such that they are more favorable to long-term investment 
financing and can lead to an effective increase of implemented projects, particularly in 
infrastructure and for SMEs.’ The leaders also: 
 
• endorsed the Work Plan prepared by the G20 Study Group on Financing for 
Investment; 
• endorsed the G20/OECD High-level Principles of Long-term Investment Financing 
by Institutional Investors; 
• noted the work underway by the World Bank Group and regional development banks 
to mobilise and catalyse additional financing for infrastructure investment, 
particularly in emerging markets and developing countries; and,  
• called for particular attention to be given to ways to improve public-private 
partnership (PPP) arrangements.  
 
The Work Plan of the G20 Study Group on Financing for Investment has set in train a 
number of studies relevant to infrastructure investment. These cover capital markets and 
local-currency bond markets (including enhanced coordination of technical assistance from 
international organisations), as well as a comparative analysis of financial market deepening 
in emerging and advanced economies. Other studies will cover securitisation and equity 
markets, and the role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in long-term investment, especially 
in infrastructure. 
 
The OECD, having led the development of the High-level Principles for Long-term 
Investment Financing (see below) will shift its focus to a more practical and detailed 
examination of insurance and pension funds as long-term investors in infrastructure. This will 
include both old models (listed funds, private equity and monoline guaranteed project bonds) 
and new forms (direct/co-investment or club format investment, such as the pooling of 
pension funds, open-ended models, EU/UK project bonds initiatives, and debt funds and 
institutional investors’ direct lending).  
 
Several of the study projects will directly address a request from G20 leaders’ to provide 
analysis that will ‘drive well-founded, evidence-based policy initiatives’. An example is the 
                                                          
1 Visiting Fellow, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 G20. G20 leaders' declaration. 6 September 2013: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-
declaration.html. 
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OECD’s project to examine the risk/return characteristics of private infrastructure 
investments, drawing on a large data sample of specific investments (which the OECD can 
access because it can offer anonymity and independent objectivity). This should be of interest 
to both investors (benchmarking their own portfolios) and regulators in investment countries. 
The World Bank will lead a study on Practical Solutions and Models for Addressing 
Obstacles to Institutional Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries, focusing on 
providing examples of infrastructure investments (successes and failures) in developing 
economies by institutional investors. Based on the findings of these case studies, a set of 
‘models’ will be suggested for how institutional investors might operate. 
 
Also relevant to infrastructure are the High-level Principles of Long-term Investment 
Financing by Institutional Investors, endorsed at St Petersburg. These principles have largely 
been developed by the OECD, but with very extensive consultation and input from a wide 
range of international agencies, including the multilateral development banks. The principles 
are designed to assist the OECD, the G20 and any other interested countries to facilitate and 
promote long-term investment by institutional investors, particularly among those 
institutions, such as pension funds, insurers and sovereign wealth funds, that typically have 
long duration liabilities and consequently can consider long-term investments in 
infrastructure. Such institutions hold global assets of $US85 trillion. The principles also cover 
the development and governance of these latter institutions with regards to: regulation and tax 
treatment; suitable financial instruments; information sharing and disclosure; financial 
education; and consumer protection. 
 
The wide participation in the development of the principles has resulted in an omnibus 
document, with many issues covered at a high level of generality. There is something for 
everyone, without much attempt to discuss the merits of alternative approaches, or to identify 
the operational challenges. With these principles now at a highly refined stage, it seems time 
for the G20 to ‘declare victory’ on this project and steer the very considerable resources that 
have been devoted to this broad topic, towards narrower and more specific aspects of the 
subject, as set out in the Work Plan of the Study Group. 
 
The remainder of this paper was written prior to the St Petersburg summit. 
 
Introduction 
 
The G20’s interest in long-term investment financing was identified at Seoul in 2010. As G20 
chair, Russia has nominated to include this topic within the forum’s agenda for 2013. A 
diagnostic report assessing factors affecting long-term financing was prepared by the 
international organisations and presented to G20 finance ministers at their meeting on 15-16 
February 2013. A taskforce has subsequently been established to examine the report.3  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 High-Level Panel on Infrastructure. Recommendations to G20 - final report. October 2011: 
http://www.boell.org/downloads/HPL_Report_on_Infrastructure_10-26-2011.pdf; MDB Working Group on 
Infrastructure. Infrastructure action plan: submission to the G20 by the MDB working group on infrastructure. 
October 2011: http://www.boell.org/downloads/MDBs_Infrastructure_Action_Plan.pdf.  
 
 
8 
There are already substantial reports that have been written in response.4 At the same time, 
independently, there has been growing interest in this broad topic from the G30,5 McKinsey6 
and others. The Australian deputy prime minister announced in January 2013 that regional 
infrastructure development would be a priority for the G20 in 2014. However, long-term 
funding is a crowded field, and if Australia is to make a contribution, it will have to identify 
how the G20 can add value. The focus of this paper is confined to one important aspect of 
long-term financing: facilitating infrastructure financing.  
 
This paper looks at what needs to be done for, and where the G20 might contribute to, 
infrastructure financing. The following dot points contain a summary of the argument made 
in this paper. 
 
• No one disputes the potential of very substantial beneficial infrastructure expenditure 
with high social returns, especially in developing countries. 
• The potential funding for this expenditure exists at a global macro level, with the 
world experiencing a prolonged saving/investment imbalance with excess ex ante 
savings, reflected in low long-term official interest rates. 
• The nature of infrastructure presents special difficulties for a financier. Such public-
good projects are large-scale, long-term, illiquid, and present challenging revenue 
problems. To turn opportunities for macro-level funding into specific project funding 
involves detailed governance, competent project appraisals and effective intermediary 
links between funders and spenders. Putting these preconditions in place has proved 
to be a challenge, even in advanced countries, and even before the 2008 financial 
crisis severely disrupted funding channels. The 2008 crisis has altered global funding 
opportunities. Bond issues are the key to replacing some of the funding lost from the 
deleveraging of advanced-country banks. 
• Heightened concerns about budget deficits and official debt provide an additional 
constraint on funding in advanced countries. This is especially important as 
conventional budget funding has been the predominant source of infrastructure 
financing in the past and austerity efforts inevitably fall heaviest on capital spending. 
This constraint seems less pressing for the emerging economies, but the psychological 
message of austerity seems to have gained wide currency. 
• Given this budget austerity, attention turns to PPPs, often seen as a residual source of 
capital that can fill the funding gap. PPPs are a significant source of infrastructure 
funding, but the preconditions for successful PPP contracts are very demanding. 
Potentially, rather than providing a substantially larger source of funding, PPPs might 
find an expanded role in encouraging full privatisation of infrastructure services 
                                                          
4 Specifically, finance ministers and central bank governors noted in the February 2013 communiqué: ‘We look 
forward to the OECD report on the “High-level Principles of Long-term Investment Financing by Institutional 
Investors” by the Leaders` summit in St Petersburg. The FSB will continue to monitor the possible effects of 
regulatory reforms on the supply of long-term financing. We have asked the MDBs to consider modalities to 
optimize their lending capacity and to enhance the catalytic role they play in mobilizing long-term financing 
from other sources, including through PPPs. We encourage the World Bank and other relevant IOs to intensify 
their efforts in addressing weaknesses in infrastructure project preparation and design and, drawing on existing 
G-20 work, where relevant, come up with the recommendations on how to address this challenge. We also ask 
the MDBs to analyse the existing modalities of interaction with the National Development Banks (NDBs).’ For, 
the full text of the communiqué, see: G20. Communique of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors, 
Moscow. February 16 2013: http://www.fin.gc.ca/n13/13-025-eng.asp. 
5 G30 Working Group. Long-term finance and economic growth. Washington, DC, 2013. 
6 McKinsey Global Institute. Infrastructure productivity: how to save $1 trillion a year. January 2013: 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/engineering_construction/infrastructure_productivity. 
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where appropriate, and in providing the incentives for better project appraisal and 
administration, as a filter to exclude low-return ‘white elephant’ projects.  
• Because PPPs tend to have neither the capacity to fund the major part of an 
investment, nor the likelihood of ensuring widespread satisfactory governance and 
project appraisal, official debt issue will remain the main source of new funding. 
Hence, more attention should be given to expanding and improving conventional 
bond funding.  
• The existing links between infrastructure projects and sources of long-term capital are 
not well developed and the intermediaries linking them (including credit rating 
agencies) may not be appropriately aligned with the key task of presenting attractive 
investment opportunities to the ultimate sources of long-term capital, such as pension 
funds and insurance companies. 
• The constraints and challenges explored here are not principally global. Although 
common to many countries, they are largely under the control of national authorities. 
However, while resolutions to the main problems that are listed above might not lie in 
international rule-making or coordination, there remain opportunities to learn from 
others who have established successful infrastructure governance procedures and 
whose bond markets are growing quickly. The multilateral development banks 
(MDBs) could usefully expand their role in improving governance and project 
appraisals, although their funding capability will remain modest. 
• An expansion of infrastructure spending in emerging countries would be helpful for 
the global economy, both lifting demand and shifting imbalances in the right 
direction. However, while it is easy enough to propose grand plans for a coordinated 
expansion based on infrastructure spending, the necessary preconditions might not 
exist yet. 
 
The scale of the infrastructure challenge 
 
To put the task of financing infrastructure into a broad global ‘order-of-magnitude’ context, 
infrastructure investment accounted for around 3-4 per cent of GDP between 1980-2005, 
although it has been substantially higher in the fast-growing emerging economies.7 The 
OECD estimates current global infrastructure requirements stand at around $2 trillion per 
year, with a further $1 trillion needed for climate change mitigation.8 For developing 
countries (currently spending perhaps $800-900 billion per year), their infrastructure 
spending should rise to 6-8 per cent of GDP. Of the estimated $0.8-0.9 trillion per year that is 
currently invested by developing countries, the majority ($500-600 billion) is financed by 
domestic government budgets (including retained profits of state-owned infrastructure 
companies), 20-30 per cent by the private sector, and an estimated 5-8 per cent through 
developed country ODA and MDB financing.9 Other sources put the MDB share even lower, 
at around 2½-3 per cent of infrastructure financing.10  
 
                                                          
7 OECD. The role of banks, equity markets and institutional investors in long-term financing for growth and 
development: report for G20 leaders. 15-16 February 2013. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See p17 of Amar Bhattacharya, Mattia Romani and Nicholas Stern. Infrastructure for development: meeting 
the challenge. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, Grantham Research Institute on Climate 
Change and the Environment, June 2012.  
10 Sustainable Development Network Infrastructure Policy Unit. Long-term financing of infrastructure:a look at 
non-financial constraints. Issues note (no. 6) for consideration by G20. World Bank, 2013. 
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Looking ahead, it is estimated that both the plans and needs for infrastructure will 
significantly increase in scale. The ADB estimates that Asia alone will need around $750 
billion per year for the next ten years to meet its infrastructure needs.11   
 
If these numbers seem overwhelming, it is worth noting that global savings amount to $17 
trillion annually. On its own, Asia’s annual savings are worth around $4 trillion per year. 
Moreover, the world has been experiencing a persistent savings/investment imbalance, with 
substantial excess ex ante savings. Greater expenditure has the potential to shift output to a 
higher level, as well as provide the real resources required for meeting infrastructure needs. 
 
Inherent problems in the characteristics of infrastructure 
 
Setting out the characteristics of infrastructure helps identify the challenges in funding such 
projects.  
 
Infrastructure projects generally have a long-gestation, are long-lived, and require long-term 
funding. This long effective life makes accurate cost/benefit calculations uncertain, with 
room for substantially different opinions about discount rates and levels of demand for the 
service (traffic on freeways, for example). Achieving appropriate scale for a project requires 
accurate long-term forecasts and mistakes will be costly. These projects are often large-scale: 
perhaps too big for a single investor, especially if an investor seeks diversification in a 
portfolio. Thus, collective funding is required, which is more complex to arrange. The legal 
framework (affecting land tenure and bankruptcy) is often important. Large infrastructure is 
often politically contentious;12 frequently some measure of eminent domain is required to 
obtain access and land, and community angst often accompanies this. Infrastructure assets are 
illiquid and provide a small return if the project fails. There is also need for high equity 
backing during the construction phase to handle risk. 
 
Perhaps the most vexed issues relate to the level of income and return on infrastructure 
projects. Often these are public goods with substantial externalities: benefits accrue to those 
who cannot easily be required to pay for these benefits. A traffic tunnel may benefit those in 
surrounding areas as much as it benefits those actually using the tunnel. Infrastructure often 
boosts land and property asset values (e.g. rail links). Even when the beneficiaries can be 
asked to pay, there is often a history of supplying the service for free, on the basis that it is 
‘essential’, with large social benefits: water supply, for example. In other cases, services are 
still supplied at well below cost (sometime the case with electricity). In these cases, there is 
usually strong community resistance to charging a full economic price.  
 
Similarly, projects are often linked to other government-owned infrastructure and the benefits 
derived by a single project may not be easily allocated between projects. Because of the scale 
or nature of these projects (it is not efficient to lay more than one supply pipe or cable), they 
often give rise to a monopoly, making efficient and equitable pricing controversial. This 
monopoly aspect means that competition or market discipline is rarely available to enhance 
                                                          
11 Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute. Infrastructure for a seamless Asia. Manila, 
2009. 
12 In the words of U.S. House Transportation Committee Chair Bud Shuster: ‘Angels in heaven don’t decide 
where highways will be built. This is a political process.’ Quoted in Timo Henckel and Warwick McKibbin. The 
economics of infrastructure in a globalized world: issues, lessons and future challenges. Washington, DC, 
Brookings, 4 June 2010. 
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the efficiency of the provision of the service (including the maintenance of the facility) or the 
pricing (although competition can often be brought to bear during the construction phase). 
Where pricing is set through a regulatory authority, this is also open to possibilities of 
misuse, particularly if regulators are susceptible to political pressure to keep the price low. 
 
 
Funding solutions 
 
At the macro level, the principal constraint does not appear to be a shortage of funding. More 
challenging is the linking together of infrastructure projects and their specific characteristics 
with the portfolio objectives of investors.  
 
Some observers argue that there is an adequate supply of financing; it is just not flowing to 
the high-priority high-return investment opportunities. One example of this dynamic is the 
‘uphill’ flow of capital from emerging to mature economies. Moreover, a substantial part of 
international capital flows is of a short-term market-driven nature, which is of little use for 
longer-term funding. Other potential funding sources are locked up in overly large foreign 
exchange reserves (Asia alone has well over $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves). On the 
investor side, some institutional investors (sovereign wealth funds, pensions, fund managers) 
have restricted mandates and conservative management strategies. There is a long list of 
reasons why emerging economies are not easy (or low-risk) places to carry out complex 
infrastructure projects.  
 
The result is that investment portfolios are routinely significantly underweight on both 
emerging-economy assets and infrastructure. If infrastructure investment opportunities could 
be packaged with more attractive governance attributes, there is substantial long-term 
potential to bring about a reallocation of already-accumulated savings towards infrastructure 
assets.  
 
Three channels of infrastructure funding are examined here: the traditional vehicle of the 
national budget and retained earnings of infrastructure enterprises; public/private 
partnerships; and multilateral development banks. 
 
(a) Traditional funding channels 
 
The 2008 financial crisis has substantially affected the way funding is sourced: it has made 
funding cheaper, but it has also narrowed the channels between lender and borrower, such 
that lenders have become more risk-sensitive. These changes are likely to be long lasting, if 
not permanent.  
 
Policy interest rates have fallen substantially almost everywhere, allowing for cheaper 
financing costs. Further out along the yield curve, government bond rates have fallen 
dramatically, to zero or even negative in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. This has not, 
however, stimulated a burst of investment, largely because these low funding costs have 
coincided with bank deleveraging and widespread austerity as governments try to rein in 
excessive debt.  
 
At the same time, risk margins for private borrowers have widened, offsetting the fall in 
policy rates for less-favoured borrowers. Portfolio investors are far more cautious in their 
investment choices, and give higher priority to investment-grade assets. The credit rating 
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agencies have been slow to recognise the improved bankability of many of the emerging 
economies, but over time are raising the rankings.13 
 
The 2008 crisis also altered the nature of international capital flows, including flows to 
emerging countries. European banks, which had previously funded syndicate infrastructure 
loans, have pulled back and are deleveraging. Bank lending and securitisation have been 
adversely affected by the decline of the monoline insurers and derivative markets. Bond 
markets (particularly investment grade bonds) have become more important. Risk perceptions 
have sharpened, but the low rates of interest in advanced countries have created a ‘search for 
yield’ that will take some investors into new territory, especially in countries that are growing 
faster than the economically depressed advanced countries. FDI inflows to developing 
countries are projected to rebound by seventeen per cent in 2013 and reach close to US$800 
billion by 2014.14 The proportion of this amount that will flow into infrastructure is 
anticipated to remain at its historical level. 
 
If bank syndicate lending is likely to be more limited in the future, where will the 
replacement funding come from? The segment of the financial sector that has expanded most 
since 2008 is bond issuance. This expansion has come not only in US-dollar-denominated 
issues, but in local currency issues as well. The prospects for enlarging the scale of such 
issues are good, even in less sophisticated markets, and especially if the issuer is a sovereign 
or has a sovereign guarantee.15 
 
However, the task is not so much to develop a sophisticated financial market (which is many 
years away for some emerging economies), as it is to identify what specific types of bonds 
will be of most interest to investors, and that simultaneously complement the characteristics 
of infrastructure discussed earlier. By emphasising the development of a narrow range of 
simple standardised and well-regarded financial products with depth to their markets, strong 
ancillary markets in futures and derivatives would develop quickly without further official 
promotion. 
 
Part of the problem is the scanty knowledge and the tendency of portfolio managers to favour 
preferred investment habitats.16 Academic analysis of capital flows often exaggerates the 
degree of substitutability between assets: small differences in attributes can make an asset 
unfamiliar (and thus unattractive) for an investor or portfolio manager. It would be helpful if 
the ultimate investors (not the intermediaries) were able to engage in a dialogue with the 
bond issuers to ensure that bond attributes match their investors’ requirements and that the 
flow of monitoring information is adequate. While retaining the idea of pursuing a few 
simple instruments as a way of developing deeper markets, these instruments might be 
presented to investors in various formats. For example, region-wide currency funds (e.g. 
Asian Bond Fund No 217) may be attractive to investors seeking currency and country 
                                                          
13 Sustainable Development Network Infrastructure Policy Unit, Long-term financing of infrastructure: a look at 
non-financial constraints. Issues note (no. 6) for consideration by G20. 
14 Ibid. 
15 For a discussion of bond fund prospects in Asia, see Mangal Goswami and Sunil Sharma. The development of 
local debt markets in Asia. IMF Working Paper 11/132 June 2011. See also, Ilhyock Shim. Development of 
Asia-Pacific corporate bond and securitisation markets. BIS Papers BIS, 2012. 
16 One source of information is the ADB Bond Monitor, available online: 
http://asianbondsonline.adb.org/regional/abm.php 
17 Guonan Ma and Eli M Remolona. Opening markets through a regional bond fund: lessons from ABF2. BIS 
Quarterly Review (June) 2005, pp 81-92; Eric Chan, Michael Chui, Frank Packer and Eli M Remolona. Local 
currency bond markets and the Asian bond fund 2 initiative. BIS, 14 July 2011.  
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diversification. Promoting bonds on a collective regional basis, rather than the bonds of 
individual countries, may also have some merit.18 
 
There will be room, too, for specialised infrastructure funds such as the ASEAN 
Infrastructure Fund19 to issue bonds that can supplement equity funding made available by 
member countries. 
 
(b) Public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
 
The history of PPPs, in all of their various forms, goes back centuries. Railway construction 
in the US and the UK provide examples where the characteristics of infrastructure produced 
innovative risk- and profit-sharing solutions, particularly where the private party could be 
compensated for valuable externalities through land grants. This kept the governance simple 
and internalised many of the externalities. 
 
Recent decades have seen an intense focus on promoting PPPs, largely driven by the types of 
funding constraints faced by governments. 
 
Analysis of PPPs is complicated by the variety of projects that are described as ‘PPPs’. Given 
the origins of the concept as a funding measure, some countries include any infrastructure 
project not funded by the government as a PPP. Some include projects where there is some 
private-sector finance of the project (e.g. standard trade financing), while others include the 
sale of government-owned assets with full transfer of operations. It would seem more useful 
to confine the ‘PPP’ nomenclature to those projects where the private sector owns assets that 
are used to provide services directly under the management of the government. Even this 
approach leaves ambiguity in comparisons, as countries will differ on which services are 
provided by the government. This may change over time (e.g. telecommunications services 
were often provided through government-owned monopolies but technological change has 
made it feasible to shift the supply of this service to the private sector). It is possible to 
envisage a further shift in this direction, where the private sector provides the infrastructure 
service on a commercial basis without special regulation, price setting or involvement by the 
government. There are, too, examples of private-sector-owner infrastructure that only serves 
the owner (e.g. ports or railways for resource transport). Essentially, the figures on PPPs are 
likely to vary and lack comparability. 
 
Acknowledging these definitional ambiguities, the data suggest that PPPs have so far played 
a quite modest role (at least less than the volume of discussion might imply). The OECD 
records $900 billion worth of privatisations since 1990, of which $550 billion was in 
infrastructure.20 The ADB records private participation in infrastructure in East and South 
Asia as less than $400 billion over the two decades prior to 2007. 21 
 
                                                          
18 Barry Eichengreen, Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza. A tale of two markets: bond market development 
in East Asia and Latin America. Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, October 2006. 
19 Masahiro Kawai. Financing development cooperation in Northeast Asia. ADBI Working Paper 407 ADBI, 
2013. 
20 OECD. The role of banks, equity markets and institutional investors in long-term financing for growth and 
development: report for G20 leaders.  
21 ADB. Infrastructure for supporting inclusive growth and poverty reduction in Asia. Manila, Asian 
Development Bank, 2012. 
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Comparing the characteristics of PPPs with the characteristics of infrastructure may explain 
why the bulk of infrastructure is still conventionally funded by governments and state-run 
institutions. PPPs have special and unique merits: they add useful incentives for efficiency 
and innovation at the construction and operation stage, and the increased focus on income 
flow serves as a counterweight to the tendency to under-price infrastructure services. PPPs do 
require, however, complex legal structures that clearly define the nature of the operating 
environment, pricing issues, and government guarantees.22 Where monopoly aspects exist, 
this creates the need for regulated pricing, which often adds significantly to the private 
sector’s risk-premium. The difficulty of capturing the full complexity of risk outcomes means 
there have been numerous cases where a disproportionate (and often unplanned) share of the 
risk-outcome has been borne by the public sector.23 The prevalence of ‘take or pay’ contracts 
is symptomatic of the difficulty of shifting risk to the private sector. 
 
Few emerging countries have a legal environment that can support an effective PPP 
framework.24 Even in the United Kingdom, with its sophisticated legal system, long history 
of PPP investment and its well-experienced bureaucracy, PPPs account for only 10-15 per 
cent of official capital expenditure. No other country seems to have a larger share of PPPs.  
 
While funding constraints are almost always the principal motivation for establishing PPPs, 
the current margin between official rates and private sector borrowing rates gives the public 
sector a substantial cost advantage in funding.25 Opportunities to take advantage of this 
margin have often been restricted by self-imposed debt limits (sometimes reflecting fear of 
downgrading by credit rating agencies) or budget austerity measures. The outcome has been 
the use of a more expensive funding source.26 
 
PPPs will find a way to pursue straightforward infrastructure projects,27 but decade-long 
discussions about the design of PPPs have not produced a widely accepted operating 
environment or approach which fosters more complex projects. There may be more to be 
gained by shifting industries from public provision to private provision (where risk-sharing 
issues become simpler and incentives clearer). The shift of telecommunications to the private 
sector provides a common example of this sort of re-thinking, which addresses many of the 
issues raised above. Similarly, where the infrastructure is integral to a private-sector 
commercial project, such as a mine, the role of the government is to facilitate the project 
                                                          
22 Philippe Burger and Ian Hawkesworth. How to attain value for money: comparing PPP and traditional 
infrastructure public procurement. OECD Journal on Budgeting 2011; Australian Government. Australia's 
public infrastructure: part of the answer to removing the infrastructure deficit. Infrastructure Australia, 2012.  
23 For example, part of the recent rise in Portuguese debt is attributable to contingent risk transferred from 
failing PPP projects. On risk, see: Infrastructure Finance Working Group. Infrastructure finance and funding 
reform. April 2012: http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/publications/files/IFWG_Report_FINAL.pdf.  
24 See, for example, Nicklas Garemo and Jan Mischke. Infrastructure: the governance failures. Vox, 30 March 
2013: http://www.voxeu.org/article/infrastructure-governance-failures. 
25 Cost comparisons between PPPs and government procurement are usually based on planned versus actual 
costs, not the central (and much more difficult) issue which is whether the PPP project would have cost more of 
less if it had been undertaken by the government itself. See, for example: Colin Duffield. Report on the 
performance of PPP projects in Australia when compared with a representative sample of traditionally 
procured infrastructure projects. National PPP Forum – Benchmarking Study, Phase II, 17 December 2008.  
26 For example, the sale of debt in the already-completed take-or-pay desalination project in New South Wales, 
Australia. 
27 Bhattacharyay suggests that PPPs might in future fund 30 per cent of infrastructure, see: Biswa Nath 
Bhattacharyay. Financing Asia’s infrastructure: modes of development and integration of Asian financial 
markets. ADBI Working Paper Series No. 229 ADBI, July 2010.  
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through the regulatory process (perhaps including eminent domain issues where necessary) 
but to leave the funding to the private sector. 
 
(c) The multilateral development banks 
 
The multilateral development banks (MDBs) might also have a larger role to play in 
financing infrastructure. Although the funding they currently have available for infrastructure 
is quite limited relative to the need, the MDBs might be able to find a role as an honest broker 
and technical advisor by standing between the infrastructure projects and the investors, 
ensuring cost-benefit studies are competently delivered, and providing advice on legal and 
regulatory issues (including pricing issues, such as the need for projects to generate income 
flows). Their presence would not provide guaranteed project funding, but would reassure 
both sides (especially the investors) and bring another layer of technical analysis to bear on 
the often-complex operational decisions and specifications surrounding infrastructure 
financing. This ‘technical middleman’ role would give the MDBs the opportunity to build on 
their existing expertise in this area, such as in the application and compilation of comparative 
statistics (on costs and technical issues). In this way, they would be able to participate in a 
wider range of projects, even if their funding remains limited.28 
 
Budget austerity and accounting 
 
One other legacy of the 2008 crisis is the emergence of widespread fiscal austerity in 
advanced countries. These binding budgetary constraints are much less relevant for emerging 
countries, although some of the policy messages may have transferred and piqued interest. 
 
One factor that has been unhelpful, at least when it comes to facilitating a sensible debate on 
official infrastructure expenditure, has been the conventional budgetary accounting which 
makes imperfect distinctions between routine and capital expenditure. Few countries have 
developed an official balance sheet in which debt issued to fund infrastructure is seen as 
offset, or balanced, by an income-earning infrastructure asset. A country that runs budget 
deficits to fund useful infrastructure assets is, however, in a different position to one that is 
simply funding routine expenditure. 
 
The general perception that budgets have little capacity to fund infrastructure is fostered by 
the rating agencies and perhaps even by financial markets themselves (‘bond vigilantes’). It 
may be helpful to separate out infrastructure funding (perhaps even by issuing separate 
infrastructure bonds, although these should for all operational purposes be identical to normal 
government bonds because there will be an advantage in creating depth in the bond market 
through the development of larger homogeneous assets). The budget accounts could be 
restructured to make a distinction between current and capital budgets, with an infrastructure 
balance sheet showing assets and liabilities. 
 
The way forward: what can the G20 do? 
 
There are numerous opportunities to promote more and better infrastructure funding. This 
includes better project appraisal and preparation, improved governance rules and legislation, 
                                                          
28 See, for example, Priyanka Sood, Marshall M. Mays and Michael R. Lindfield. Subnational finance for 
infrastructure: potential roles and opportunities for ADB. ADB Sustainable Development Working Paper Series 
No. 20 ADB, April 2012. 
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the development of bond markets, and the identification of government services that could be 
better carried out by the private sector.  
 
Most of this lies in the national decision-making sphere. There are, however, opportunities 
for international cooperation. Greater cross-country uniformity would reduce some of the 
research and decision-making costs borne by international investors, although broad 
comparability is usually enough, rather than strict international uniformity. Such efforts are 
often taking place at the regional level: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 
Asia is one such case.29 Another example of successful regional ‘learning-by-doing’ has been 
the Asian Bond Fund (1 and 2), a project that has helped to reveal and identify issues 
hindering the development of Asian markets. Similarly, the technical assistance on 
infrastructure provided by the World Bank, the IFC and the other MDBs can help in 
transferring good ideas and practices between countries. Many emerging countries have 
created specialised infrastructure agencies to coordinate projects and ensure proper appraisal. 
Where these agencies are prepared to accept coordination and technical support from the 
MDBs or from counterpart agencies, there is an opportunity to raise the effectiveness of these 
bodies through imitating the best-practice approach. Regional cooperative approaches such as 
the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund serve the same purpose in transferring best-practice methods.  
 
The G20 may be able to help in this spreading of best-practice approaches by urging the 
MDBs to prioritise their infrastructure support efforts, and by promoting national budgetary 
standards that more accurately reflect the differences between capital and current 
expenditures. Furthermore, engaging in a dialogue with the credit rating agencies might make 
them more responsive to the new investment opportunities and stronger credit environments 
within emerging markets. 
 
Could the G20 tackle a far more ambitious infrastructure-related task? Given the persistent ex 
ante savings/investment imbalance (currently reflected in historically low interest rates), if 
the G20 were able to initiate and coordinate a substantial expansion of infrastructure 
spending, this would reduce international imbalances and provide an expansionary boost to 
the under-performing advanced economies. Greater infrastructure financing could also 
provide an enhanced outlet for capital flows from advanced countries, and provide a stimulus 
to their capital goods exporters, while at the same time encouraging emerging economies to 
expand their current accounts by importing more infrastructure goods. Connecting the surplus 
saving of advanced countries with the high-social-return infrastructure investment 
opportunities in emerging countries is an enticing idea. So too is reversing the ‘uphill’ flow of 
capital from emerging to mature economies. These possibilities may, however, be beyond the 
G20’s reach. With country-specific factors being the main constraint on access to long-term 
investment flows, the G20’s contribution to this longer-term challenge is likely to be modest.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 Ganeshan Wignaraja. Evaluating Asia's mega-regional RTA: the regional comprehensive economic 
partnership. Vox, 6 April 2013: http://www.voxeu.org/article/mega-regionalism-asia. 
 Looking at G20 initiatives on infrastructure investment from a developing 
country’s perspective: Indonesia 
 
Maria Monica Wihardja1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Indonesia is one of the most celebrated champions of initiating infrastructure investment 
agendas at regional and global forums, including the G20. Indeed, Indonesia has frequently 
been successful in gaining support within such forums for boosting the priority of 
infrastructure investment.  
 
Indonesia’s push to prioritise infrastructure investment within the G20’s post-2008-2009 
economic recovery plan is aligned with its own urgent need for more infrastructure 
investment. Indonesia has struggled to restore infrastructure investment to pre-1997-1998 
Asian Financial Crisis levels; over 2010-2011, average infrastructure investment (in real 
terms) was still only two-thirds of that witnessed between 1995-1997.2 As a percentage of 
GDP, Indonesia’s average infrastructure spend (2010-2011) is also low for its 
neighbourhood, with the level of investment in countries such as China, Thailand and 
Vietnam approaching nearly seven per cent of GDP, compared to three per cent in Indonesia.  
 
Hence, it would be a mistake to think that Indonesia sought to place infrastructure investment 
on the G20 agenda because it regards itself as a role-model for infrastructure development. 
Instead, Indonesia is motivated more by the desire to engage with regional and global 
partners in furthering debate on infrastructure development so it might: learn lessons from 
other countries with demonstrable success in the field, build self-capacity in the sector, as 
well as benefit from any G20 attempt to boost global infrastructure investment. Needless to 
say, the development of any infrastructure development plan is useful only in so far as it is 
actually able to be implemented – otherwise, Indonesia’s desire to pursue an infrastructure 
investment initiative through the G20 may end up delivering little more than an ‘empty 
package.’  
 
As such, before accepting the recommendation of negotiators to include an agenda item or 
‘first-best’ solution to the global economic malaise within a leaders’ communiqué, serious 
consideration must be given to the credibility of, and the G20’s capacity to implement, the 
proposed policy. Accordingly, this paper will focus on the specific challenges and prospects 
that Indonesia, a key emerging economy within the G20, faces in implementing infrastructure 
development policy and in repairing the poor state of its domestic infrastructure environment.  
 
Infrastructure financing at the G20 
 
As indicated, Indonesia is one of the main pioneers of the G20’s post-crisis work on 
infrastructure investment. At the G20 summit in 2012, Indonesia proposed pursuing 
infrastructure investment through both the finance and Sherpa streams, within the context of 
the Framework of Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth (FSSBG), instead of solely 
through the Development Working Group. The proposal focused on the role infrastructure 
                                                          
1 Researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 
2 World Bank. Indonesia economic quarterly: pressures mounting. Washington, DC, March 2013, p 38. 
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investment could play in reducing global imbalances and in lifting global growth, principally 
by redirecting excess savings in some emerging countries to infrastructure financing, rather 
than financing debts in advanced economies. It was also suggested that investing in 
infrastructure would assist those G20 members suffering from fiscal policy mismanagement, 
especially in some developed countries. 
 
These initiatives are reflected in the following G20 outcomes:  
 
• The Los Cabos G20 Leaders’ Declaration 2012, Article 9 states: ‘We ask finance 
ministers and central bank governors to consider ways in which the G20 can foster 
investment in infrastructure and ensure the availability of sufficient funding for 
infrastructure projects, including Multilateral Development Banks’ (MDBs) financing 
and technical support.’ 
• The communiqué from the Washington G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors (April 2013), Article 11, states: ‘we underscore the 
importance of long-term financing for investment, including in infrastructure, in 
enhancing economic growth and job creation. We are taking forward work on this 
issue, including through the adoption of the terms of reference of the new G20 Study 
Group, with inputs envisaged from the World Bank Group, OECD, FSB, IMF, UN, 
UNCTAD, and from participating countries.’ 
• In February 2013, the G20 finance ministers endorsed the establishment of a new 
‘study group on financing for investment’ that would ‘determine a work plan for the 
G20, considering the role of private sector and official sources of long-term 
financing.’ It was officially set up in March 2013, with Indonesia and Germany as the 
inaugural co-chairs. The work program of the Study Group includes country-specific 
factors, capital markets, private sources of financing, official sources of financing, and 
global financial regulatory reforms.  
  
Domestically, Indonesia has implemented some of its G20 commitments on infrastructure. As 
part of the G20 Mutual Assessment Process, Indonesia identified the issuance of Presidential 
Regulation No. 13, 2010 – to strengthen government guarantees and government financing 
for infrastructure – as one of its structural reform priorities. Accordingly, under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Finance, a new private non-bank financial institution named ‘Indonesia 
Infrastructure Finance’ has been established and tasked with investing in commercially 
feasible infrastructure projects. The objective of Indonesia Infrastructure Finance ( IIF) is to 
fill a key gap in Indonesia’s institutional landscape for infrastructure financing and 
development, and is expected to become a national repository of experience and skills related 
to the development and financing of commercially viable infrastructure projects, as well as 
public-private partnerships (PPPs). In the medium term, the IIF plans to issue rupiah-
denominated infrastructure project bonds. Indonesia has also set up an ‘Indonesia 
Infrastructure Guarantee Fund’ (IIGF) and a ‘Viability Gap Fund’ (VGF) so as to lessen the 
risk-burden associated with investing in Indonesian infrastructure projects.  
  
By placing some pressure on Indonesia to establish a regulatory and institutional framework 
for enhancing infrastructure investment, as per its G20 commitments, the G20 has contributed 
to the implementation of positive domestic reform within Indonesia.  
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Infrastructure financing at APEC 
 
Under Indonesia's chairing of APEC in 2013, APC Leaders have also endorsed infrastructure-
financing initiatives such as the APEC Framework on Connectivity and the APEC Multi-
Year Plan on Infrastructure Investment and Development.  
  
APEC’s stated intention in promoting cooperation on infrastructure development and 
investment is to take advantage of regional expertise, experience and funding sources, 
including from multilateral and regional development banks, as well as the private sector. 
Some examples of public-private joint initiatives within the APEC region include:  
 
• the Asia Pacific Infrastructure Partnership (APIP), where governments have worked 
with the private sector to boost design, finance and implementation capacity with 
regards to economic infrastructure; and  
• the Asia Pacific Financial Forum, which has been tasked with strengthening the 
region's financial systems so that the private sector has a greater incentive to invest in 
new infrastructure projects and thereby enhance policy outcomes in health, social 
welfare and other similar areas. The forum will work on a ‘convergent approach’ that 
encourages regional economic and financial sector integration. The forum's first 
meeting took place in April 2013 in Australia.  
 
Infrastructure financing at ASEAN 
 
Indonesia has also established and promoted infrastructure-financing initiatives through 
ASEAN. ASEAN now has the: 
 
• ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity (AMPC); 
• ASEAN Infrastructure Fund (AIF); and 
• Asian Bond Initiatives, as part of long-term strategy for infrastructure financing. 
 
All ASEAN member countries (Myanmar is in the process of membership), as well as the 
ADB, are participants in the AIF. The AIF's objective is to better meet regional financing 
needs not only through sovereign funds, but also – importantly – through private investment 
in regional infrastructure development. Specifically, the AIF seeks to improve the utility of 
local currency bond markets in supporting infrastructure development, as well as attract more 
project investment from sovereign wealth funds and private institutional investors, such as 
pension funds and other long-term investors. Indonesia is interested in working with the G20 
to ‘scale up’ this initiative to a global level. 
 
The need for synergy between the infrastructure agendas of regional and global forums  
 
Although infrastructure financing is a multi-faceted issue beyond any single regional or 
global institution, achieving better synergy between the various comparative advantages of 
the regional and global institutions outlined below, should be an essential part of future 
planning. 
 
• As most ASEAN members are developing countries, ASEAN institutions have the 
advantage of being able to bring ‘developing country perspectives’ to infrastructure 
investment projects. ASEAN has also already devised a list of potential projects 
within its region. 
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• APEC’s strength lies in being able to address private sector concerns about the 
regulatory and soundness of the regional infrastructure investment climate, 
particularly those of institutional investors. 
• The G20’s advantage is that it can assess infrastructure financing within the context of 
international financing arrangements, imbalances, global financial stability, and fiscal 
reform.  
 
Infrastructure investment in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia is in a dire need of infrastructure. In recent years it has increased its budget-spend 
on capital expenditure and has enacted policies and institutional frameworks related to 
infrastructure development.  
 
Currently, Indonesia has a Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's 
Economic Development (MP3EI), a visionary project on infrastructure and connectivity 
valued at around US$468 billion between 2011 and 2025. However, Indonesia's MP3EI relies 
too much on private sector financing. The private sector is expected to fund about fifty-one 
per cent of the total project value. This is a very high contribution when compared to other 
similar regional and global initiatives, and not least within the context of the heavy 
expectation that has already been placed on the private sector to invest in Indonesia’s current 
medium-term development plan (RPJMN). The RPJMN hinges on the private sector being 
able to contribute more than seventy per cent of US$150 billion in investment needs 
identified by the RPJMN. However it is worth observing that the MP3EI is regarded by some 
critics as a politically driven project primarily aimed at ‘opening corridors’ in all major 
islands in order to win the heart of people (or votes) all around Indonesia. Other analysts 
view the RPJMN initiative as little more than a fanciful dream or prayer.  
 
Indonesia's infrastructure problem is not just a matter of sourcing financing, as it also cuts 
across domestic structural, institutional and regulatory issues. (Some might also say there is a 
lack of political commitment). For instance, vertical and horizontal fragmentation within the 
government has been identified as a major roadblock to the successful implementation of 
infrastructure development. Regulatory barriers, including the land acquisition bill, protection 
of the services sector, unequal treatment of private sectors that challenge state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs looking for profitable projects), and matters related to PPPs such as 
guarantee funds and the viability gap fund (not yet fully operational), are also all major 
infrastructure issues.  
  
Furthermore, the political popularity of large infrastructure projects, especially roads, affects 
the incentive structure that political leaders face in allocating funds between projects. For 
example, at the local level, there is some evidence that once local leaders have been directly 
elected by constituents, there is an increase in the number of paved roads, but a decrease in 
the number of passable roads, indicating that road quantity may come at the cost of road 
quality.3 Nevertheless, the study does suggest that building better roads increases the 
electability of local leaders in general.  
 
                                                          
3 Ari Kuncoro, Vid Adrison and Ifa Isfandiarni. Varieties of governance of public goods delivery in Indonesia: 
the case of roads after decentralization and local democratization. Working Paper in Economics and Business 3 
(1) 2013. 
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The story above fits with the empirical data; the World Bank study on infrastructure 
investment shows that the transport sector, particularly roads, accounts for an increasing 
share of infrastructure investment in Indonesia.4 Its share of total infrastructure investment 
has gone up from twenty per cent in 1995-1997 to over fifty per cent between 2010-2011. 
(See Figure 1)  
 
Figure 1: share of total infrastructure investment (per cent) 
 
Source: Pressures Mounting. Indonesia Economic Quarterly, March 2013, Figure 56, p. 41. 
 
Much of the increase has been driven by sub-national road investment. Between 2001-2009 
the length of districts’ roads increased by one third, from 287,577km to 384,810km. 
However, the same study reported a number of spending efficiency concerns, including: 
‘insufficient level of operation and maintenance spending, institutional fragmentation leading 
to new road investment that does not lie within an integrated transportation network, and sub-
standard design and road quality.’5 Due to institutional issues involving decentralisation 
(autonomous districts), vertical and horizontal fragmentation between the levels of 
government, regulatory barriers, etc., it is not surprising that toll road development (that often 
needs to cross district boundaries), relative to sub-national road building, has been below 
about a third of the targeted increase.6  
 
The role of PPPs in Indonesia 
 
In general, PPP schemes in Indonesia are still weak and suffer from viability issues. 
Indonesia currently only has one viable PPP project, namely, the Central Java Power Plant, 
which was put out for tender and is now on the verge of financial close. However, this does 
not guarantee that the plant will be built soon, as sources familiar with the project have noted 
                                                          
4 World Bank, Indonesia economic quarterly: pressures mounting, p. 41.  
5 Ibid, p 41.  
6 Ibid, p 41. 
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that the average delay between the signing of a contract and the implementation of such 
projects is about seven years.7  
 
Other PPP projects are still either under the ‘project-readiness stage’, ‘financial viability 
study stage’ (supported by Viability Gap Fund) or the ‘transaction stage’. Projects within 
these categories include: drinking water initiatives in Umbulan, East Java and in Bandar City, 
Lampung; the Soekarno-Hatta Airport railway; and a coal railway in Central Kalimantan. It is 
worth noting that not all infrastructure investment in Indonesia is dependent upon a PPP 
arrangement: the government is directly funding electricity projects that will allow it to 
complete the second stage of its commitment to add an additional 10,000 MW to Indonesia’s 
power supply (otherwise known as the Fast Track Programme II).  
 
One contributing factor to Indonesia’s lack of viable PPP opportunities is the sheer difficulty 
of developing projects with acceptable rates of return on investment (ROI). Even projects 
with high economic returns tend not to be perceived as commercially viable, as they are not 
carefully developed and structured in a way that is attractive to investors. The limited amount 
of human and financial resources available for project development exacerbates the problem. 
There is also a large risk-perception gap between private and public sector that needs to be 
overcome.  
 
Indeed, the shrinking share of private sector investment in Indonesia’s infrastructure has been 
one of the most notable changes within the composition of Indonesia’s infrastructure 
investment since the 1997-1998 crisis. The World Bank study on infrastructure notes that the 
contribution of the private sector, as a proportion of total infrastructure investment in 
Indonesia, declined from almost one-third in 1996-1997 to ten per cent in 2010-2011 (see 
Figure 2).8 The study contends that the trend ‘likely partly reflects the regulatory and 
institutional challenges that Indonesia is facing in attracting PPP.’9  
  
Figure 2: Share of total infrastructure investment, per cent 
 
Source: Pressures Mounting. Indonesia Economic Quarterly, March 2013, Figure 53, p.40. 
                                                          
7 Original research of the author. 
8 World Bank, Indonesia economic quarterly: pressures mounting, p 40. 
9 Ibid, p 40. 
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Meanwhile, Figure 2 also shows that government investment in infrastructure has been 
increasingly made at the sub-national level, which is not surprising given the big-bang fiscal 
decentralisation that occurred in 2001. The sharp fall in energy investment (by sixty-three per 
cent between 1995-1997 and 2010-2011) and the telecommunication sector (by sixty-nine per 
cent for the same period) accounts for the entire thirty per cent fall in total real infrastructure 
investment since the Asian Financial Crisis. In part, the decrease in national government 
infrastructure expenditure is also due to the detrimental effect that inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies have had upon the government budget. Despite Indonesia's dilapidated physical 
infrastructure, almost thirty per cent of the 2013 national budget has been allocated to poorly 
targeted energy subsidies, with only twelve per cent set aside for infrastructure, and five per 
cent for social expenditure.10  
 
Summary 
 
International pressure and cooperation is needed if Indonesia is to effectively reform and 
improve its own domestic infrastructure environment. Hence, as this paper shows, Indonesia 
has much to gain from getting infrastructure development issues on to the agenda of regional 
and global forums. Indonesia’s experience is also informative in that the G20 must 
necessarily recognise and incorporate the particular challenges that Indonesia and other 
emerging economy members face in order to achieve a consensus outcome on infrastructure 
financing. However, Indonesia does not explicitly pursue solutions to its own domestic 
infrastructure situation within G20 leaders’ meetings – it usually raises infrastructure 
financing at a more general ‘government-to-government level’, within the context of 
responding to crisis-related and global growth issues, as well as the impact of global financial 
regulatory reform on long-term financing.  
 
This paper has also shown that there is a clear and essential need to build up greater 
‘synergies’ between the infrastructure work that is already underway in various regional and 
global forums. At APEC, for example, there is more space to discuss domestic regulatory 
issues and good regulatory reform practices within the APEC work streams on infrastructure 
development and investment, as well as in other sub-APEC initiatives that target structural 
reform, such as the APEC New Strategy for Structural Reforms (ANSSR). Indonesia can 
facilitate greater inter-forum collaboration by helping to align the infrastructure work of the 
G20, APEC, ASEAN and the OECD Regulatory Reform Review by discussing the best way 
forward for implementing domestic structural reforms within each process. 
 
What can the G20 do to help member and non-member countries that face similar 
infrastructure-financing issues to those of Indonesia? 
 
There are a number of things the G20 could and should do to assist member and non-member 
countries address infrastructure-financing issues. 
 
• Draw upon its own processes to allocate infrastructure priorities in a more cooperative 
and coordinated manner. For example, the finance ministers’ and central bank 
governors' channel can focus on the long-term financing issues of infrastructure in the 
                                                          
10 Needless to say, the subsidies for fossil fuels have other opportunity costs, including degradation of the 
environment, the lowering of incentives for renewable energy innovation, and the worsening of Indonesia’s 
balance of payments. It was only in June of 2013 that the government finally sought to reduce fossil fuel 
subsidies, and accordingly revise the national budget.  
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context of crisis, fiscal reforms and global economic growth (the array of issues that 
lie within the framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth – the FSSBG).  
• Draw upon the main G20 outreach initiatives to enhance its own process of policy 
formation: the Think20 can provide input into discussions about the regulatory and 
implementation challenges of infrastructure financing; the C20 can add-value in 
locating where the need for infrastructure lies (demand-side issues); while the B20 
can bring its expertise to the field of PPPs and any other challenges that the private 
sector must overcome before investing in infrastructure. Every aspect of 
infrastructure, from the supply to demand side issues, from financing to regulatory 
issues, needs to be addressed accordingly. 
• Encourage higher-level coordination between different governmental agencies and 
ministries. In the case of Indonesia, this would mean greater coordination among the 
Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of 
Development Planning, as well as the Ministry of Finance. Local governments also 
need to be engaged more. Hence, stronger coordination among central and local 
governments, the creation of an applicable coordination monitoring scheme and the 
contribution of reform-minded champions would all be required to achieve 
coordination and implementation milestones.  
• Recognise that services are inputs to productivity. Regulatory reforms related to 
service sectors, such as air, land or sea transportation (toll roads, railways etc.), 
telecommunications, financial, logistics, energy (oil and gas), water supply, etc., are 
often needed to successfully implement infrastructure projects. Key regulatory 
uncertainties that involve land, investment and trade restrictions also need to be 
resolved. In this area, the G20 can draw lessons from APEC, which has completed a 
sizable body of work on Good Regulatory Practices.  
• Encourage competition and the equal treatment of private sector and state-owned 
enterprises. Institutions that have been developed to support or promote infrastructure 
investment should be placed under an independent (or more independent) regulator.  
• Support the establishment of institutions that can champion PPPs, especially within 
countries that rely heavily on the private sector to finance infrastructure development. 
These institutions could take the form of guarantee funds, viability gap financing 
funds, etc. 
• Encourage the development of local currency bond markets, so as to minimise the 
currency mismatch risks inherent in external financing with foreign currency. 
Potential maturity mismatches can also dissuade investors from engaging in long-term 
infrastructure investments. More generally, the G20 should support regional, local and 
sub-national bond programs that can help finance infrastructure development, 
especially in the Asian region, given its excess savings.  
• Lastly, draw lessons from the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund and consider whether (or 
how) they can be applied on a global scale.  
 
More than anything else, the G20 needs to maintain its credibility. Only by focusing on 
specific obstacles to the implementation of its commitments, such as those inhibiting 
infrastructure investment in Indonesia, can the G20 maintain its credibility and become a real 
global champion of its own initiatives.  
 A 7-point plan for the G20 infrastructure financing agenda 
 
Daniela Strube1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At the St Petersburg summit, leaders emphasised the role of long-term investment for 
sustainable growth and job creation. The focus was on financing for infrastructure 
investment, but leaders were also concerned about the long-term financing needs of other 
sectors, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In terms of forward action, 
leaders committed to ‘identify and start to implement by the Brisbane summit a set of 
collective and country-specific actions that tangibly improve our domestic investment 
environments such that they are more favourable to long-term investment financing.’ They 
also called for an extension of the analysis of challenges associated with the availability of 
long-term investment financing, and requested finance ministers develop policy 
recommendations by the next summit. In addition, leaders endorsed the OECD’s High-level 
Principles of Long-term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors and asked finance 
ministers and central bank governors to identify updated approaches to their implementation 
by the next summit. Leaders also called on finance ministers to identify, before the Brisbane 
summit, measures to facilitate domestic capital market developments and improve the 
intermediation of global savings for productive long-term investments.  
 
In determining how or whether the G20 can deliver on its commitments, the critical 
underlying question is ‘where can the G20 add value to the task of facilitating long-term 
investment financing?’ This paper concentrates on the issue of long-term infrastructure 
financing. 
 
Where can the G20 add value? 
 
The G20’s structure as an informal, high-level group enables it to assist policy-making in two 
broad ways, namely through advocacy and coordination. In terms of the former, it can help 
promote domestic policy measures in any area that the group considers important and/or 
urgent for its member countries – although the G20 has no power to compel countries to 
adopt specific policy measures. As such, while peer pressure can assist, for the G20’s 
advocacy role to be effective, it should be complemented by members making tangible 
commitments to implement specific policy changes domestically, as well as hold themselves 
accountable to the rest of the members in delivering on these commitments.  
 
However, a unique advantage of the G20 lies in its second role: the capacity to generate a 
coordinated response to systemic issues that stem from global public goods (GPGs). Public 
goods are characterised by non-rivalry and non-excludability. Non-rivalry requires that even 
when more people start to use a good or service, the benefits from consuming it do not 
diminish. Non-excludability means that no one can be excluded from using the good or 
service. There is also an important spatial dimension to consider, as GPG’s create 
(unintended) effects that have global reach. Consequently, they require globally coordinated 
responses. The World Bank classifies the environment (climate and biodiversity), 
                                                          
1 Research Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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communicable diseases, international trade, the international financial architecture, and 
knowledge as GPGs.2  
 
Infrastructure financing is a ‘cross-cutting’ issue 
 
Infrastructure is both rival and excludable. Any immediate effects that it generates are local, 
or at most regional. Therefore, infrastructure is not a GPG. Nonetheless, infrastructure 
investment can create unintended consequences, for example, by raising land values in 
nearby areas or by facilitating additional pollution.3 The G20’s work on long-term investment 
financing largely recognises that infrastructure is not a GPG. The G20 Study Group’s work 
has instead concentrated on country-specific factors that affect a country’s ability to attract 
long-term financing. However, to stimulate infrastructure investment, there must be a sound 
economic and political framework that can elicit an investor’s confidence. Because this 
requires policy intervention in a variety of areas, it is still appropriate and consistent to 
consider infrastructure financing as a ‘cross-cutting’ issue within the context of the G20, as 
opposed to a ‘work stream’ independent from other policy areas. Placing the cross-cutting 
nature of infrastructure in its proper context also ensures that two-way spillover effects with 
other policy areas can properly be taken into account.  
 
As mentioned, the G20 can be effective in supporting infrastructure policy by engaging in 
both coordination and advocacy. ‘Collective actions’ require the development of a coherent 
G20 approach in areas such as macroeconomic policy coordination and financial market 
regulation (coordination). Raising awareness at the leaders’ level and committing to domestic 
policy changes also are appropriate approaches for implementing ‘country-specific actions’ 
(advocacy).  
 
One of the outcomes from the St Petersburg summit on infrastructure investment issues was 
the endorsement of the G20/OECD High-level Principles on Long-term Investment Financing 
by Institutional Investors and the G20 Workplan on Financing for Investment. However, the 
OECD principles are very general in nature, highlighting that progress on infrastructure 
investment largely depends on there being improvements to a variety of economic policy 
areas such as financial market regulation, taxation and competition policy. These 
fundamental economic policy areas are already key components of the G20 agenda.  
 
Nevertheless, consistent with the approach of viewing long-term investment financing as a 
‘cross-cutting issue’, and in line with the spirit of the G20’s High-level Principles, the Study 
Group on Financing for Investment (SG) should focus on identifying where G20 
commitments in other policy areas can be ‘infrastructure-friendly’, i.e. identifying which G20 
policies are likely to affect infrastructure investment and making sure that the impact on the 
                                                          
2 This definition comes from the World Bank. See Independent Evaluation Group. Shared Global Challenges. 
Annual review of development effectiveness World Bank, 2008, p 41. 
3 Physical infrastructure sectors, including transport, communication, water and sanitation and power, are 
network industries. Network industries are based on a network of production and/or service nodes. The most 
distinctive feature of network industries is the role of network effects. The value of the (infrastructure) network 
to users depends on its size. This gives rise to external effects. If a road network, for example, is extended, not 
only new users benefit, but also the people that were already connected to the network are better off, because 
they can now reach a larger area. In addition to these positive and (intended) external effects, unintended 
consequences are also possible. For example, owners of land close to the new roads are likely to see an increase 
in the value of their land, even without contributing to the project. This is a classic ‘free-rider’ situation. More 
roads may also increase pollution, negatively affecting not only road users, but everybody in the area. These 
external effects require targeted regulatory intervention. 
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environment for long-term investment financing is appropriately considered. This approach 
avoids the unnecessary duplication of effort. Implementing the Principles will in turn require 
both collective and country-specific actions. Financial market regulation, for example, is an 
area where a coordinated global response is essential for achieving an effective policy 
outcome. Because of extensive international linkages via financial flows, no one country can 
address this issue on its own. 
 
The Study Group’s workplan provides an overview of the large number of reports 
commissioned by the G20. They address a variety of specific issues, mostly regarding 
infrastructure financing. This work is clearly valuable in advancing an understanding of the 
infrastructure investment challenge. However, it does not require extensive discussion at the 
leader’s level. The task that officials face is to identify if there is a significant issue in the 
area of long-term investment financing that requires the specific attention of leaders at the 
next summit.  
 
Building on the basis that the G20’s work on infrastructure should have a ‘cross-cutting’ 
approach across the G20 agenda, below are some suggestions on how infrastructure financing 
should be taken into account in advancing ‘core’ G20 work in areas such as macroeconomic 
policy, financial market stability and climate change. 
 
Infrastructure financing and financial markets 
 
Three priorities can be identified for the G20’s work on financial markets. First, the G20 
should continue its efforts to promote sound and efficient financial markets. However, to 
date, the G20’s work in this area has been disproportionately focused on the experience of 
advanced countries, particularly in Europe and the US, and should pay more attention to the 
challenges faced by emerging economies. This refocusing is necessary if finance ministers 
are to meet the request put to them by leaders, to identify ways to improve the intermediation 
of global savings. Emerging economies hold large savings, but have predominantly invested 
in the advanced world while their own domestic long-term investment projects remain 
underfinanced. Advanced country investors are still equally hesitant to commit broadly to 
emerging country markets. Addressing this inconsistency should be a major objective for the 
G20 in 2014.  
 
Second, consistent with placing a greater focus on long-term investment challenges faced by 
emerging economies, priority should be given to promoting local currency bond markets 
(LCBMs) and long-term investment funds (LTIFs). LCBMs have been on the G20’s agenda 
since the Cannes summit, where the G20 LCBM Action Plan was endorsed. The action plan 
triggered improvements in the coordination of technical assistance among international 
organisations (IOs), enhanced data availability and led to the development of a common 
diagnostic framework. Nevertheless, important constraints on both the demand and the 
supply side of LCBMs remain, and likely require dedicated government intervention before 
they can be resolved. 
 
On the demand side, investors’ concerns about LCBM depth presents a classic ‘chicken and 
egg’ problem: investors are reluctant to invest because of insufficient scale, but strong 
investment is required before the market can ‘scale up.’ On the supply side, many emerging 
markets ‘have struggled to create LCBM[s] comparable to those in advanced economies, 
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despite having sound fundamentals’4 and scepticism with regard to foreign investment is still 
widespread. On their own, market forces are likely to achieve only slow growth in LCBMs.  
The common diagnostic framework that has been developed as part of the G20 LCBM Action 
Plan highlights how ‘a strong high-level government commitment to upgrade and reform 
LCBM[s] is necessary to ensure sustainability of the reform efforts.’5 Given the analytical 
work that has already been done in this area, the G20 is well placed to promote LCBMs as 
both promising and financially sensible investment opportunities. This may help to move 
LCBMs further into the ‘mainstream’ of what is generally considered to be a safe and 
financially sound investment strategy. Highlighting best practices such as the Asian Bond 
Fund 2 (ABF 2) could also be effective.  
 
This promotional work could be supported by a dedicated information campaign, led by 
national central banks and research institutes. As part of this campaign, institutional investors 
should be specifically considered as suitable investors for LCBMs. Institutional investors 
include pension funds, life insurers, sovereign wealth funds and state-owned investment 
funds, as well as national development banks. Moreover, emerging markets should commit to 
further develop existing LCBMs like the ABF 2, including opening up to foreign investors. If 
MDBs and G20 members redirect technical and financial assistance towards LCBM 
development in future budget allocation decisions, thereby reflecting a new reprioritisation of 
the issue, then this may provide further momentum to existing global efforts to promote 
LCBMs and encourage their development in other emerging markets.  
 
Similar efforts are required for promoting LTIFs. This includes both the promotion of 
existing initiatives, such as the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund , as well as enhanced support for 
the development of comparable funds. For the promotion of both LCBMs and LTIFs, a 
continued commitment by G20 member countries to foster a stable enabling macroeconomic 
environment is vital. For the establishment of nascent LCBMs, the common diagnostic 
framework suggests that ‘a broad sequencing in this context would begin with the appropriate 
macroeconomic reforms and establishing robust legal, regulatory, and supervisory 
frameworks before moving to any specific measures of market deregulation or expansion of 
the investor base.’6 The common diagnostic framework also provides an assessment tool for 
preparing reform efforts in this area. G20 leaders should explicitly commit to apply the 
recommendations set out in the analytical work that emerged from the G20 LCBM Action 
Plan. 
 
The St Petersburg leaders’ declaration notes that particular attention should be given to 
improving the design of, and conditions for, productive public-private partnerships (PPPs). In 
order to facilitate progress in this area, a clear PPP framework has to be developed for 
individual G20 member countries. There would be value in establishing a set of common 
principles for domestic PPP frameworks. Some harmonisation of approaches would help 
reduce search costs for investors and introduce greater certainty into infrastructure investment 
arrangements. Some of the key elements that should be covered in the development of PPP 
principles include: the importance of legal certainty; competitive tendering being the 
instrument of choice for allocating projects; the need for full transparency; and the effective 
devolution of competencies to other levels of government, in order to enable them to deal 
with the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects efficiently. Finally, the 
                                                          
4 IMF, World Bank, EBRD and OECD. Local currency bond markets - a diagnostic framework. July 2013. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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principles should also acknowledge the advantages of having an independent regulatory body 
that can deal with infrastructure investment and minimise political and industry capture.  
 
Infrastructure and the environment 
 
The G20’s work on infrastructure financing should take into account the importance of 
avoiding negative environmental (especially climate) impacts as much as possible. One 
intuitive way of highlighting the efficiency gains that can be made from infrastructure 
investment can be found in McKinsey’sestimate that sixteen per cent of the infrastructure 
investment that is required to keep energy supply in check with projected growth, could be 
saved by an alternative plan built around improving the efficiency of existing energy 
infrastructure assets. 7  
 
A more efficient use of existing infrastructure requires demand-side policies, whereas many 
countries have historically focused on the supply side, in particular on urban transport 
infrastructure. The G20 should promote the importance of demand-side policies and other 
productivity-enhanced measures, in particular regarding incentives for using mass transit 
modes of transport, as an effective complement to supply side interventions. Demand-side 
policies go beyond congestion pricing. Non-price alternatives include using traffic-
monitoring technologies for optimising traffic flows. These efforts should be part of a broader 
strategy, including human capital development and appropriate long-term planning that 
allocates sufficient financial resources to infrastructure maintenance. Infrastructure 
development should also be embedded into a comprehensive urban plan. In particular, 
planning of transport infrastructure and land use should be integrated. Such productivity-
enhancing policy principles ought to come under a broad commitment by G20 leaders to 
address these issues domestically.  
 
One specific area that promises enormous benefits in terms of making transport infrastructure 
‘greener’ is non-motorised transport (NMT) infrastructure. NMT reflects the objective of 
developing ‘smart infrastructure’, rather than just building more roads. Not only does NMT 
infrastructure reduce pollution, but it also improves transport accessibility and safety. While 
the environmental aspect is generally compelling, accessibility and safety are particularly 
important issues for emerging market G20 members. Poorer people are disproportionally 
affected by road hazards. Ninety per cent of all road casualties occur in low-middle-income 
countries, even though less than half of the global vehicle fleet operates in these countries. 8  
NMT is also more affordable for poorer people and therefore has additional equity benefits. 
Given that a very high number of people in emerging and developing countries have to rely 
on NMT,9 NMT infrastructure should be more sufficient and a greater policy focus. The G20 
should make an explicit commitment to focus on extending NMT infrastructure domestically, 
ideally setting numerical targets. 
 
Summary – A 7-point plan for advancing the G20’s infrastructure financing agenda 
 
In summary, there are seven steps the G20 can take in advancing its work on infrastructure 
financing: 
• View infrastructure as a cross-cutting issue on the G20’s agenda. Focus the Study 
Group’s work on integrating infrastructure concerns with other G20 policies, in 
                                                          
7 McKinsey Global Institute. Infrastructure productivity: how to save $1 trillion a year.  
8 UNEP. Share the road: investment in walking and cycling road infrastructure. Nairobi, November 2010. 
9 For example, more than 60 per cent of people living in Wuhan, China, ibid. 
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particular in the areas of financial markets and climate policy, without compromising 
the overarching policy goals in these broader policy areas. 
• Refocus the work on financial markets to pay more attention to the challenges facing 
emerging markets. 
• Promote LCBMs and LTIFs as promising and financially sound investment 
opportunities. 
• Redirect technical and financial assistance to support the development of LCBMs and 
LTIFs. 
• Commit to developing clear PPP frameworks domestically. Agree on joint principles 
in order to provide an appropriate degree of harmonisation in PPP arrangements 
across G20 members. 
• Commit to improving the productivity of existing infrastructure assets domestically, 
in particular by promoting demand-side policies. 
• Commit to extending NMT infrastructure domestically. 
 
 
 Reforming international taxation: the role of the G20 
 
Mike Callaghan and Marty Harris1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Efforts to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance were a major outcome from the St 
Petersburg summit on 5-6 September 2013.  
 
This paper reviews the role that the G20 can play in promoting reforms that will combat tax 
avoidance and evasion and, in particular, the approach Australia should take when it chairs 
the G20 in 2014. 
 
The G20’s involvement in combating tax havens 
 
In 1998 the OECD released a report, ‘Harmful Tax Competition, an Emerging Global Issue’, 
marking the start of a substantial amount of work by the OECD on the issue.2 Work initially 
proceeded on three fronts: 
 
• identifying and eliminating harmful features of preferential tax regimes in OECD 
countries; 
• identifying tax havens and promoting tax transparency; and 
• encouraging non-OECD countries to participate in this work. 
 
The OECD laid down a set of criteria for identifying tax havens, namely, those jurisdictions 
with: no or only nominal tax; a lack of effective exchange of information; a lack of 
transparency; and no substantial activities. The OECD proposed blacklisting and imposing 
international sanctions on identified tax havens. It was a controversial exercise, and was 
subsequently ‘relaxed’. ‘Zero tax’ and ‘no activities’ were dropped as criteria for identifying 
a tax haven, and the idea of sanctions moved to the background. The OECD’s work in this 
area was largely carried out through the Global Forum, which consisted of ‘OECD countries 
and jurisdictions that had agreed to implement transparency and exchange of information for 
tax purposes.’3 However, while many tax havens announced their commitment to the 
OECD’s criteria, in many cases implementation remained poor. 
 
The London G20 summit in April 2009 represented a turning point in the international effort 
to combat tax havens. In the months prior to the summit, tax scandals involving financial 
institutions in Liechtenstein and Switzerland resulted in significant political pressure placed 
on the governments of France, Germany and the United States to crack down on the 
opportunities available to citizens to channel their profits through tax havens, and thereby 
avoid tax. The global financial crisis compounded the pressure being applied to tax havens.  
Weak regulation within tax havens was seen to have facilitated the use of risky financial 
                                                          
1 Mike Callaghan is Director of the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. Marty 
Harris is Research Associate at the Lowy Institute for International Policy 
2 OECD. Harmful tax competition: an emerging global issue. Paris, OECD, 1998. 
3 OECD. Global forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes. 5 September 2013: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/. 
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products, and as fiscal challenges rose, governments had an increased incentive to recover 
‘lost’ tax revenue.  
 
At the London summit, G20 leaders agreed to take action against non-cooperative 
jurisdictions, including tax havens, stating: ‘We stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect our 
public finances and financial systems. The era of banking secrecy is over.’4 In addition, the 
G20 ‘took note’ of three lists prepared by the OECD that categorised financial centres 
according to their respective level of transparency. The first was the ‘white list’, comprised of 
jurisdictions that had concluded at least 12 bilateral agreements with other jurisdictions that 
contained provisions on information exchange according to the OECD standard. The second 
was the ‘grey list’ – jurisdictions that had committed to, but not yet substantially 
implemented, internationally agreed tax standards. The grey list contained thirty jurisdictions,  
including Chile, Singapore, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland. The ‘black list’ 
contained four jurisdictions that had not committed to the internationally agreed tax standard 
– Costa Rica, Malaysia (Labuan), Philippines and Uruguay.5 
 
The preparation and publication of these lists was controversial. For example, the work was 
targeting countries that were not members of the OECD. In particular, China was concerned 
about the treatment of the Chinese territories Hong Kong and Macau. The compromise was to 
put China on the ‘white’ list with a footnote that Hong Kong and Macau, ‘which have 
committed to implement the internationally agreed tax standard’ were not included. In 
addition, the list was only ‘noted’ and not ‘endorsed’ by the G20. 
 
However, the action taken at the London summit was effective. A few days after the summit, 
all countries on the ‘black list’ committed to implement the standard, while the number of 
countries on the grey list declined over time, as identified jurisdictions gradually moved to 
meet the standard. At the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, G20 leaders ‘committed to 
maintain the momentum in dealing with tax havens’, and stated: ‘the main focus will be to 
improve tax transparency and exchange of information so that countries can fully enforce 
their tax laws to protect their tax base.’ In September 2009, the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes was restructured and had its 
membership expanded to include all OECD members, G20 countries and offshore 
jurisdictions. It now consists of 177 members. The Forum has become a consensus-based 
organisation where all members are on equal footing, serviced by staff from the OECD. The 
Global Forum has also begun a peer-review process to monitor both jurisdictions’ regulatory 
frameworks and implementation of the agreed standard. As of April 2013, 68 jurisdictions 
have provided follow-up reports to the Global Forum, outlining actions they have taken to 
address the Forum’s recommendations.  
 
The Global Forum claims that ‘since 2009, the capacity for cooperation in international tax 
matters has improved significantly.’6 It also notes that there has been a dramatic increase in 
the number of bilateral tax information exchange agreements and a number of formerly 
                                                          
4 G20. Leaders' declaration: summit on financial markets and the world economy. November 2008: 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf. 
5 OECD. A progress report on the jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in implementing the 
internationally agreed tax standard. 2 April 2009: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/42497950.pdf. 
6 OECD Secretary-General. Secretary-general's report to G20 finance ministers. Paris, OECD, 2013. 
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secretive jurisdictions – including Singapore, Austria, and Luxembourg – have agreed to sign 
the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.7 
 
Notwithstanding this progress, concerns have been raised about the overall effectiveness of 
the aforementioned efforts in expanding tax transparency. The ‘internationally agreed 
standard’ of having 12 bilateral agreements is arbitrary and does not guarantee a global 
system that ensures an adequate exchange of taxation information. Implementation of the 
agreements is also a concern. In addition, agreements based on exchanging requested tax 
information currently involve burdensome and lengthy procedures. 
 
For these reasons, the multilateral automatic exchange of information is considered to be a 
superior approach. Automatic information exchange is a system where a source jurisdiction 
periodically transmits ‘bulk’ taxpayer information to the taxpayer’s country of residence. 
This allows tax administrators to determine whether an individual has accurately reported 
their foreign source income, and to calculate an individual’s net worth with more ease. 
According to the OECD, automatic information exchange can offer timely information on tax 
evasion, as well as provide a powerful deterrent to potential non-compliers.8 
 
The promotion of automatic tax information exchange has been taken up by the G20. At the 
St Petersburg summit, leaders endorsed the OECD proposal of a truly global model for 
multilateral and bilateral automatic exchange of tax information. The aim is to have a new 
global standard for the exchange of information completed by February 2014, and to finalise 
technical modalities such that G20 countries can automatically exchange tax information by 
the end of 2015. 
 
The role of the G20 in promoting the exchange of tax information 
 
The G20 has played a significant role in enhancing the exchange of tax information. The 
political ‘momentum’ that the G20 has given to this issue demonstrates how G20 leaders can 
facilitate and boost the work of an international body, even one with a membership that does 
not include all G20 countries, such as the OECD. Absent the G20’s endorsement and the 
inclusion of major emerging markets, it is difficult to see how the same progress in advancing 
the exchange of tax information and reducing bank secrecy would have been achieved. It is 
also important that the G20 supports the work of the OECD in this area, rather than 
attempting to set up its own processes. However, the existence of ‘black’ lists and the threat 
of sanctions are also likely to have played an important role in encouraging action. 
 
As far as implementing the automatic exchange of tax information is concerned, the technical 
work lies with the OECD. The timetable for implementation is tight, and it will not be met 
simply because of the political weight that the G20 can provide. A range of controversial 
issues still need to be resolved, including the establishment of mechanisms that will ensure 
ongoing confidential and proper use of shared tax information. It is also essential to deliver 
on the leaders’ commitment at St Petersburg that all countries, but particularly developing 
countries, benefit from the automatic exchange of information. Australia’s priority in 2014 
will be to ensure that the G20 delivers on these commitments. 
                                                          
7 OECD. Austria, Luxembourg and Singapore among countries signing-on to end tax secrecy. OECD 
Newsroom, 29 May 2013: http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/austria-luxembourg-and-singapore-among-countries-
signing-on-to-end-tax-secrecy.htm. 
8 OECD. Automatic exchange of information: what it is, how it works, benefits, what remains to be done. Paris, 
OECD, 23 July 2012. 
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Base erosion and profit shifting 
 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax planning strategies by corporate entities 
that exploit tax rule loopholes in order to make profits disappear for tax purposes, or that shift 
profits to locations where there is little or no real activity and which are lightly taxed, 
resulting in the payment of little or no overall corporate tax.9 The effort to combat BEPS is 
considered one of the main achievements of the St Petersburg summit (although it was not 
highlighted as a priority when Russia assumed the presidency in December 2012). However, 
the issue has been on the G20’s agenda for some time and is related to the earlier work by the 
OECD/G20 on harmful tax practices and improving tax information exchanges. 
 
As part of the Multi-Year Plan on Infrastructure Investment and Development that was 
released at the G20 Seoul summit in November 2010, the OECD was requested to ‘enhance 
its work to counter the erosion of developing countries’ tax bases, and to submit a report to 
the G20 on the issue by September 2011.10 The ensuing report largely focused on 
transparency and the development of tax information exchange agreements, mostly as 
supplements to already existing double tax agreements that had provided for the sharing of 
information. The report also observed that corporate non-compliance, due to the use of 
structures anchored in other countries, as well as abusive transfer pricing, might undermine 
the domestic tax base of a jurisdiction.  
 
The Los Cabos summit in June 2012 built upon this. Leaders stated: ‘…we re-iterate the need 
to prevent base erosion and profit shifting and we will follow with attention the ongoing work 
of the OECD in this area.’ At the time, there was significant and growing concern about 
BEPS, not just from developing countries, but also due to the emergence of several high-
profile cases involving multinational corporations such as Google, Amazon and Starbucks, 
that had large operations in developed countries but were taking advantage of their 
multinational arrangements to pay minimal tax. For example, it is estimated that Google’s 
advertising revenue in Australia in 2011 was close to A$1 billion, yet its filing with the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission indicated that it paid tax of A$74,176 in 
that year.11 
 
However, beyond the high-profile cases that involve players like Google and Amazon, it is 
difficult to establish the extent to which artificial profit shifting has eroded the corporate tax 
base. The Australian Treasury has noted the problem of establishing a relevant benchmark. 
One approach might be to analyse aggregate trends in corporate tax collections, but it is 
difficult to isolate the impact of tax planning strategies from other factors. The OECD 
suggests the revenue at stake is substantial. The IMF cites a study for the United States that 
estimates the annual revenue loss from profit shifting lies somewhere between $10 and $60 
                                                          
9 Centre for Tax Policy and Administration. BEPS - frequently asked questions. OECD 2013: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm. 
10 G20 Seoul summit leaders’ declaration. 12 November 2010. 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/summits/2010seoul.html 
11 Mike Seccombe. Google: don't be evil, don't pay tax. 7 June 2012: 
http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/google-dont-be-evil-dont-pay-tax/261/. 
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billion (the higher figure being about one-quarter of all receipts from the federal corporate 
income tax in 2012).12 
 
The communiqué from the meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in 
Mexico City on 5 November 2012 stated: ‘we also welcome the work that the OECD is 
undertaking into the problem of base erosion and profit shifting and look forward to a report 
about progress of the work at the next meeting.’13  
 
In February 2013 the OECD released a report ‘Addressing Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting’.14 The report states ‘… current international tax standards may not have kept pace 
with changes in global business practices, in particular the areas of intangibles and the 
development of the digital economy.’ The report also noted that international tax rules were 
developed almost one hundred years ago when products were manufactured, physically 
transported, and sold. Such rules do not easily apply in a digital age where businesses do not 
always require physical presence in a country to operate, the most valuable assets, such as 
intellectual property, are not fixed, and it is difficult to establish the value-add that should be 
taxed at each stage of a long and international production chain.  
 
The OECD report concludes that in order to address base erosion and profit shifting, a 
comprehensive action plan should be developed quickly, with the basic objective of 
providing countries with the instruments to better align their right to collect tax with real 
economic activity. The OECD also notes that the response will require some ‘out of the box’ 
thinking, ambition, and pragmatism to overcome implementation difficulties. 
 
In February 2013, G20 finance ministers and central bank governors welcomed the OECD 
report, stated that they were determined to develop measures to address base erosion and 
profit shifting, and that they looked forward to the comprehensive action plan that the OECD 
would present to them in July 2013.15 At St Petersburg, leaders fully endorsed the OECD 
action plan and the establishment of a G20/OECD BEPS project and ‘encouraged all 
interested countries to participate’. 
 
OECD action plan to counter base erosion and profit shifting 
 
The OECD action plan lists 15 work streams, each with an accompanying timeline. The work 
streams broadly work on one of the following four areas:16  
 
general actions: addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy; neutralising the 
effects of hybrids; strengthening controlled foreign corportation (CFC) rules; limiting 
base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments; and transparency; 
• permanent establishments and transfer pricing: investigating the artificial avoidance 
of permanent establishment status; aligning permanent establishment outcomes with 
value creation; and re-examining transfer pricing documentation; 
                                                          
12 IMF. Issues in international taxation and the role of the IMF. Washington, DC, IMF, 28 June 2013. 
13 G20. Communique of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors, Mexico City. 5 November 2012: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-121105-finance-en.html. 
14 OECD. Addressing base erosion and profit shifting. Paris, OECD, 12 February 2013. 
15 G20. Communiqué of meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors. February 16 2013: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0216-finance.html. 
16 PwC. OECD's action plan published on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). Tax policy bulletin PwC, 19 
July 2013. 
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• treaty actions: preventing treaty abuse and developing a related multilateral 
instrument; and 
• data and transparency: requiring taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning 
arrangements; and establishing methodologies to collect and analyse data on BEPS 
and the actions to address it. 
 
This is an extremely ambitious exercise that the OECD is seeking to complete within two 
years. Some of the reactions to the action plan include:17 
 
• Bill Dodwell, head of tax policy at Deloitte, who has labeled the plan ‘the most 
significant potential change to international taxation for decades’; 
• Chris Morgan, head of tax policy at KPMG, who suggests there is now ‘potential for 
[a] seismic shift’; and 
• James Anderson from Skadden, who likened the developments to an ‘OECD reboot 
for [the] 21st century’. 
 
The magnitude of the task being contemplated is reflected in the above comments. This 
sentiment is echoed by Richard Collier, tax partner at PwC: ‘The BEPS action plan is a 
movement, not an isolated project. The scale of its ambition means change is not going to 
happen overnight. Change will come from countries adopting domestic rules, changes to 
international tax treaties and changes to the practical application of existing rules by both tax 
authorities and business.’18 Collier is certainly right when he says that these changes will not 
come overnight – it will be a lengthy and contentious exercise.  
 
The 15 elements in the OECD action plan are pitched at a very high level, and perhaps the 
most ambitious of these commitments is to address the tax challenges of the digital age. Here, 
‘the devil will be in the detail’, and, more precisely, in getting agreement on the detail. The 
scale of the challenge is recognised by the OECD when it states that while it has well 
developed processes for finding consensus on routine matters, it will ‘need to find ways to 
accomplish the work quickly while seeking consensus’.19 Moreover, it needs to move quickly 
in areas where there is currently no consensus on what the tax rules should be, or on how 
existing tax rules should apply.20 When it comes to international tax reforms, the precedent is 
for very long timeframes. There will also be strong and active lobbying by corporations about 
the details of the plan, with the United States Council for International Business and the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) warning that ill-considered measures could hit job 
creation, trade and innovation.21  
 
The role of the G20, and Australia, in addressing BEPS in 2014 
 
                                                          
17 Tax Journal. BEPS: who is saying what. Tax Journal, 19 July 2013: 
http://www.taxjournal.com/tj/articles/beps-who-saying-what-19072013. 
18 PwC. PwC: OECD project could mark biggest reform of global taxation in lifetime. Pwc Blog, 19 July 2013: 
http://pwc.blogs.com/press_room/2013/07/pwc-oecd-project-could-mark-biggest-reform-of-global-taxation-in-
lifetime.html, ibid. 
19 OECD. Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting. Paris, OECD Publishing, 2013. 
20 PwC. OECD initiative on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). Tax policy bulletin PwC, April 2013. 
21 Reuters. G20 to tackle loopholes used by big companies like Google and Apple. independent.ie, 19 July 2013: 
http://www.independent.ie/business/g20-to-tackle-loopholes-used-by-big-companies-like-google-and-apple-
29432677.html. 
 
 
37 
Addressing BEPS requires a multilateral response. As the IMF has highlighted, the 
overarching problem is the ‘fundamental difficulty that national tax policies create cross-
country spillovers. The opportunities for avoidance and evasion that are now such a concern 
are a very high manifestation of such spillovers.’22 In a similar vein, the Australian Treasury 
concludes that ‘erosion of corporate tax bases raises important global issues and addressing 
these issues is beyond the ability of any one country acting alone. It is therefore important 
that Australia’s interests are prosecuted through multilateral forums.’23 
 
The OECD has taken the lead over many years in pursuing a wide range of global tax 
initiatives, including producing a model tax treaty and guiding countries in their 
implementation. The OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs has the technical expertise in this 
very complex area. The Australian Treasury noted that the OECD’s expertise ‘makes it the 
logical forum for the development and implementation of technical improvements to the 
international tax framework.’ Footnote? 
 
However, the OECD is a consensus-based organisation with 33 member states, which does 
not include the major emerging markets that are members of the G20. And as was evident 
when the G20 first addressed the issue of base erosion and profit shifting, this lack of 
representation is a major concern for developing countries.  
 
Accordingly, the OECD action plan recognises the need for an inclusive process. In order to 
facilitate greater involvement of major non-OECD economies, it will launch the ‘BEPS 
Project’. Interested G20 countries that are not members of the OECD will be invited to be 
part of the BEPS Project as ‘Associates’, and they will participate on an equal footing with 
OECD members. Other non-OECD members will be invited to participate on an ad-hoc basis. 
The concerns of developing countries are directly mentioned, and the action plan observes 
that the UN Task Force on Tax and Development and the OECD Global Relations 
Programme should provide a useful platform for discussing specific BEPS concerns in the 
case of developing countries. 
 
In terms of the role that the G20 can play, the wider membership of the forum is an 
advantage. On their own, the OECD members could not deal with the international 
implications of BEPS. But it is important that the OECD drives the technical development of 
the BEPS Project, and that there is no attempt by the G20 to duplicate the work of the OECD. 
The G20 should instead focus on providing political momentum, ensuring there is wide 
outreach and that developing countries are involved. Drawing from the example of the Global 
Forum on Tax Transparency, it would be preferable to present the BEPS Project as a broader 
international initiative designed to modernise international tax laws, rather than as an 
OECD/G20 branded exercise. 
 
As noted, the area where the G20 can make the biggest contribution on tax reform, but also 
where it faces its most critical challenge, is in maintaining momentum; not only in getting 
consensus on new international tax laws, but also seeing these translated into domestic laws. 
And it is essential that Australia as chair ensures that momentum is maintained in 2014. The 
G20’s credibility will be severely damaged if what is considered to be a major achievement at 
one summit is largely ‘dropped’ when the chair passes to another member. But it will be 
challenging for Australia to maintain momentum; progress will be difficult and controversial, 
                                                          
22 IMF, Issues in international taxation and the role of the IMF. 
23 The Australian Government the Treasury. Risks to the sustainability of Australia’s corporate tax base. 
Canberra, The Treasury, 2013. 
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and there are no quick fixes. A balance has to be struck between being seen to be taking 
action and sending a clear signal to the community that concerns are being addressed, and not 
setting excessively tight deadlines that result in the scope of the exercise being reduced and 
leading to sub-optimal outcomes. 
 
As chair of the G20 in 2014, Australia should focus on three areas in advancing the BEPS 
Project. 
 
First, while the technical details are being developed, the G20 has to ensure that the project 
maintains a high political profile and that the emphasis is on reaching early consensus. 
Throughout 2014, the G20 should focus on ensuring greater transparency at all levels. As the 
OECD action plan notes, while progress has been made through the Global Forum on the 
sharing of tax information between authorities, greater transparency on many fronts is 
required to prevent BEPS. In particular, the G20 could drive requirements for taxpayers in all 
jurisdictions to disclose more targeted information about their tax planning strategies. The 
threat of reputational damage that can come from the exposure of aggressive tax planning 
strategies can be a powerful tool in combating tax avoidance. This should include 
requirements around reporting on the beneficial ownership of companies. In addition, a major 
effort should be directed at getting all G20 members to commit to the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative, which is a global standard for revenue transparency and 
accountability in the extractive industry sector. Importantly, transparency can be enhanced 
relatively quickly and does not require the negotiation of an international agreement or 
protocol. 
 
Second, place the work on BEPS in a broader context, and present it as part of the rapidly 
changing and increasingly integrated global economy. To date, the core of the problem has 
been the failure of international tax laws to keep up with global and technological 
developments, including the rise of the digital economy. The advent of 3D printing will likely 
further diffuse manufacturing activity across many jurisdictions. But the pace of development 
will clearly not stop, and it will have implications beyond tax laws. For example, trade policy 
has also not kept pace with the rise of value added chains, with goods now being ‘made in the 
world’ rather than in a single country. As chair of the G20 in 2014, Australia should initiate a 
more holistic and forward-looking analysis of the implications of corporate and technological 
developments for economic management. 
 
Third, it is important that the BEPS Project is seen to be a global exercise and not solely a 
OECD/G20 project. Australia could go beyond including BEPS as part of its broader G20 
outreach activities and consider a meeting involving G20 and non-G20 ministers on ensuring 
that international tax laws keep pace with the developments in the global economy, with a 
particular focus on the situation confronting developing economies. The G20 members need 
to avoid giving the impression that they have only allocated a high priority to corporate tax 
avoidance because there have been high-profile cases inside their own jurisdictions. This will 
help to address an ongoing and major concern for developing countries. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The G20 has played a significant role in combating tax havens and advancing the exchange 
of tax information. The G20’s work in this area is an example of how the forum can provide 
political momentum to an issue that extends well beyond its own membership. It is essential 
for the credibility of the G20 that Australia ensures that the new single global standard for the 
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automatic exchange of tax information is completed in line with the commitment made at St 
Petersburg. 
 
The G20 must also continue to provide political momentum to the task of combating 
corporate base erosion and profit shifting. The G20’s endorsement of the OECD action plan 
was important, but it was an easy first step. The challenge is to develop, agree and then 
implement the 15 elements outlined in the action plan. But this is a complex and contentious 
issue, where the history of achieving international agreement is one of slow progress.  
 
When Australia assumes the chair of the G20 in 2014, it must ensure that progress is 
maintained, but it also has to carefully manage expectations. There are no quick fixes and the 
BEPS Project has to be seen as a long-term and ongoing movement rather than a one-off 
exercise. In particular, ill-considered and rushed measures to meet arbitrarily imposed 
deadlines must be avoided. 
 
The three areas where Australia, as chair, can focus G20 efforts are: making tangible progress 
in requiring taxpayers to disclose more targeted information about their tax planning 
strategies; putting the BEPS Project in the broader context of a more holistic and forward 
looking consideration of the implications of corporate and technological developments on 
economic management; and ensuring that the concerns and interest of developing countries 
are adequately taken into account.  
 Multilateral response to base erosion and profit shifting 
 
Philip Anderson1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) is the term currently used for all forms of tax 
avoidance and evasion involving tax minimisation that has been enabled by the international 
tax planning activities of multinational companies, unincorporated enterprises and 
individuals.  
 
One form of tax minimisation is straight-out tax evasion, which is generally regarded as 
activity that is inconsistent with existing taxation laws. Clearly this type of activity is 
important to tax agencies throughout the world and requires a response with a strong 
emphasis on tax enforcement and improved collection processes. It is worth noting that large 
multinational corporations, particularly those that are publicly listed, do not generally engage 
in this type of activity since the reputational risks are too great. 
 
Tax avoidance, on the other hand is usually regarded as the minimisation of global tax 
liabilities by exploiting particular features of the tax laws of particular countries, especially 
where the incentive and ability to do so is enhanced by differing approaches to taxation in 
different countries. This type of minimisation activity is very common amongst multinational 
corporations. Indeed, most financial and legal commentators would argue that it is entirely 
appropriate for companies to take steps to minimise their tax liabilities, in the same way that 
they should act to minimise their operating costs. Despite this, it is clear that some of the 
more high-profile corporations that have recently received adverse publicity about their 
avoidance activities have become more sensitive to public criticism of their tax minimisation 
strategies. 
 
This article focuses on the so-called tax avoidance activity that arises when multinational 
corporations, enabled by the international nature of their business models, take advantage of 
tax system differences between countries to realise a reduction in their effective tax rates, 
well below the nominal rates of the countries in which they predominately operate. This type 
of activity has received a great deal of recent attention: in international forums, in the 
international press, in the work of the OECD, from fiscal departments within specific 
countries (including the Australian Treasury) and through investigations by parliamentary 
bodies, such as in the UK and the USA. There is now an increased sense of urgency that 
action needs to be taken to reduce tax minimisation activity. Governments are concerned that 
multinational corporations should not be able to reduce their tax liability in this way, both 
because of unfair advantages that multinational corporations enjoy compared with their 
purely domestic counterparts, and because of the view that everyone should be contributing 
their fair share of taxes. 
 
Nature of the Problem 
 
The world has spent almost one hundred years defining international tax rules that were 
originally intended to reduce the incidence of double or multiple taxation for businesses that 
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operated over multiple jurisdictions. Because of the international nature of these issues, the 
rules had to be developed within a multilateral framework. The first work in this area was 
undertaken by the League of Nations in the 1920s. 
 
A further milestone was the OECD Model Tax Convention, held in 1963. The OECD model 
has been maintained over subsequent decades and still forms the basis, with some variation, 
for most of the Double Tax Agreements (DTAs) that have been entered into by developed 
countries since that time. Developing countries have generally pushed for additional 
variations to the OECD model, but the underlying principles are evident in virtually all of the 
three thousand or so DTAs currently in existence. 
 
The OECD has also led the way in developing transfer pricing guidelines which, while not 
binding on individual countries, are now widely accepted by member and non-member 
countries alike.2 These guidelines provide a framework that allows for the pricing of 
transactions between related companies to be evaluated, so as to ensure that the allocation of 
profits arising from such transactions is fair and reasonable given the nature of the economic 
factors related to the transactions. 
 
The important single factor linking all of these processes over almost a century is that they 
have involved the development of multilateral frameworks, within which countries could still 
frame their own taxation laws. Some of the key features of these multilateral frameworks 
include the following: 
 
• definitions of the place of residence of companies, so that wherever possible the place 
of residence of a company can be uniquely defined; 
• the concept of ‘source’ – the jurisdiction where income from a transaction is thought 
to be derived; 
• the concept of a ‘permanent establishment’ – part of an entity which is regarded as 
being resident in a certain jurisdiction, allowing that jurisdiction to exercise its right to 
tax the business profits of that permanent establishment – to help further clarify 
residence and source;3 
• DTAs typically contains substantial definitions of what is and what is not a permanent 
establishment; and 
• transfer pricing guidelines based around the ‘arm’s length’ principle, which strives 
to ensure that the pricing of transactions between related parties matches as closely as 
possible to what would have occurred between unrelated parties dealing at ‘arm’s 
length’ with each other. 
 
As a result of these multilateral frameworks, the taxation systems of individual countries are 
interrelated; an outcome that has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that 
business can be carried out internationally with little risk of double taxation, as profits are 
taxed only in a single jurisdiction (or at least are maintained via credits for taxes paid in other 
jurisdictions). 
 
                                                          
2 OECD. Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations. Paris, OECD, 18 
August 2010. 
3 The Australian Government the Treasury. Risks to the sustainability of Australia’s corporate tax base. 
Canberra, The Treasury, 2013. 
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The disadvantage is that taxpayers can exploit different interpretations of these multilateral 
frameworks within different jurisdictions so as to reduce their tax liabilities substantially, in 
some cases achieving what is referred to as ‘double non-taxation’. The current debate on tax 
avoidance by multilateral corporations centres around a view that weaknesses in these 
multilateral frameworks, combined with modern business models, have contributed to an 
unacceptable level of tax avoidance that needs to be addressed. 
 
The avoidance activities of increasingly globalised businesses have highlighted the 
weaknesses in existing international tax agreements. Yet having been placed under the 
spotlight for most of the past year, there is some tendency to view the mounting problems as 
specific to the information technology industry. However, this categorisation is misleading, 
as the avoidance problems that are under consideration touch on a much wider spectrum of 
industries – essentially, any business where global supply chains, intangible property and 
related party transactions are significant. In this sense, the problems are not necessarily new, 
but have merely garnered more attention due to several high-profile avoidance cases 
surfacing in the media at a time when countries are highly focused on weakening government 
revenue positions. Moreover, there is a concern that if action is not taken now, the situation 
will deteriorate further. 
 
Recent work by both the OECD and the Australian Treasury has pointed to the difficulty of 
measuring the overall impact that base erosion and profit shifting have had on government 
tax revenues around the world. 4Other studies have been more definitive, finding that there 
has been significant erosion in tax revenue, at least in the US.5 From the perspective of both 
equity and economic neutrality, the issue of BEPS needs to be resolved, largely to restore 
integrity to the tax system, and to head off the possible further leakage of revenue as global 
business models continue to expand. Nevertheless, the contribution of this to revenue 
collections and economic activity must be kept in perspective. 
 
Dealing with the problem 
 
There is little doubt that some of the existing bilateral and multilateral approaches to 
international taxation need overhauling in order to adequately adapt to modern business 
practices. The OECD has recently proposed a comprehensive fifteen-point action plan6 to 
tackle this problem. The advantage of an OECD/G20 sponsored approach is that it provides 
for changes to international taxation within a multilateral framework, which will both 
facilitate improved tax compliance by corporations and increase the effectiveness of the tax 
system in minimising tax avoidance.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important not to underestimate the problems that lie ahead in completing 
and implementing the OECD action plan. Many of the fifteen points in the plan require 
multilateral agreements in order to be effective, and experience has shown the difficulties in 
developing, negotiating and implementing such agreements. A number of countries have used 
aspects of their tax systems to attract certain types of international business, such as regional 
headquarters, financial centres, logistics centres, etc. If the OECD action plan proposes to 
neutralise the effectiveness of these arrangements, there is likely to be considerable 
opposition that will delay implementation of the plan. In addition, combined OECD and G20 
                                                          
4 OECD. Addressing base erosion and profit shifting. Paris, OECD, 12 February 2013.The Australian 
Government the Treasury, Risks to the sustainability of Australia’s corporate tax base. 
5 IMF. Issues in international taxation and the role of the IMF. Washington, DC, IMF, 28 June 2013. 
6 OECD. Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting. Paris, OECD Publishing, 2013. 
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membership represents only twenty per cent of the countries in the world. Even though this 
group contains most of the largest economies in the world, it is clear from the current 
situation that small economies can play a major role in international tax planning. It will be 
important to ensure that the interests of other countries are taken into account if proposed 
changes are to be effective. As noted earlier, there are over three thousand DTAs in force 
around the world. The OECD would like to obviate the need to renegotiate all of these 
agreements in order to implement changes, but this can only be achieved if all countries with 
DTAs in force are able to accept the terms of the proposed multilateral instrument. Past 
experience with such international instruments is that they can take several years to develop, 
and an even longer period to be validated by a workable majority of countries. 
 
Setting priorities 
 
If the fifteen point OECD action plan experiences delays because of inherent difficulties in 
overcoming differences, it will be important for both individual countries and the OECD/G20 
to look at ways of dealing more effectively with international tax avoidance using tools 
already available to them. Two approaches are available.  
 
First, tax authorities around the world already have a considerable array of powers to collect 
taxes from multilateral corporations. Some of the problems that have been apparent in 
individual countries could be dealt with, at least partly, by a combination of modest changes 
to domestic laws and through more efficient tax enforcement. Even without changes to 
existing international agreements, many countries could achieve better outcomes by 
improving enforcement procedures in areas such as: fees charged for the provision of 
services, payment of interest on intercompany loans, and payment for intangibles. All of 
these areas are already covered by existing OECD transfer pricing guidelines, thereby 
enabling countries to achieve more without imposing the burden of double taxation on 
multilateral corporations. 
 
Second, within the proposed OECD action plan, there are some steps that will be easier to 
negotiate than others. Some of the steps will be best achieved by updating or refining the 
existing transfer pricing guidelines and the OECD Model Tax Convention, both of which 
already have support from the OECD and many other countries. Thus, proposals relating to 
documentation, disclosure of aggressive tax planning arrangements, allocation of risks and 
capital, dispute resolution mechanisms, and treaty abuse should attract a sufficient level of 
support that enables substantial progress in a relatively short space of time. 
 
One objective particularly worth pursuing is the facilitation of a more effective exchange of 
tax information between jurisdictions. Most DTAs include a clause allowing for the exchange 
of information between the treaty partners, but this has not been well used in the past and is 
often bogged down in administrative delays. Reform is required, but for the process to work 
effectively and efficiently, it will probably be necessary to develop internationally accepted 
templates for requesting the cross-border exchange of information. Even at a domestic level, 
information requests from corporations typically proceed very slowly. If the process is to 
work at the international level, the way in which information can be requested will need to be 
more clearly defined.  
 
Some of the more challenging issues 
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A number of points within the OECD action plan are likely to prove particularly challenging 
to certain countries. These include possible changes to the definition of permanent 
establishments (PEs), proposals to neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements 
and the strengthening of rules relating to the activities of Controlled Foreign Corporations 
(CFCs). Not only are these technically difficult areas of taxation law, certain countries have 
used these areas to achieve positive policy outcomes that encourage (or at least do not 
discourage) business activity. In the case of CFC rules, only a limited number of countries 
have such rules in place, as the tendency over the past decade has been to relax the impact of 
these rules out of a concern that they may discourage the international expansion of domestic 
business. However, by way of countering the effects of BEPS, there is likely to be 
considerable resistance to an expansion of CFC rules, particularly by those countries that 
have not sought to adopt such measures in the past. 
 
The reforms under consideration have come at a time when the practice of corporate taxation 
is being challenged by the international mobility of capital. Over the past decade, corporate 
tax rates have declined across the board, and no apparent reversal of this trend is in sight. 
Most countries have responded to this competitive environment by lowering the nominal rate 
of tax, but tax incentives for such things as capital investment, R&D and employment 
creation remain important. Hence, as countries are gearing up to deal with international tax 
avoidance, they are simultaneously facing leakage from the corporate tax base through other 
channels. Thus, international tax reform should not be seen in a vacuum. Governments need 
to look at reforms in this area against the backdrop of their overall policies for raising 
taxation revenue and on tax reform in general. 
 
Most of the focus of the debate on international tax avoidance has been on corporate income 
tax. However, the OECD has noted that indirect taxes also need to be considered. The OECD 
has mentioned the challenge of imposing value-added taxes (VAT/GST) on cross border 
transactions involving the digital supply of goods and services.7 This has become an 
increasingly important issue, as customers are able to order goods online and return them if 
unsuitable at virtually zero cost. Such developments are beginning to foster a significant 
leakage of indirect tax revenue, as well as pose a challenge to the competitive position of 
domestic businesses that are required to charge the relevant rate of VAT/GST on equivalent 
transactions.8 Governments already have the capacity to act in this area by updating domestic 
legislation, but tax collection remains a problem and it is likely that some international 
cooperation would improve affairs. 
 
Proposals to tidy up international taxation are also likely to encounter problems in 
determining which jurisdiction is entitled to the taxation revenue currently being avoided. For 
example, consider the recently highly publicised usage of the ‘Irish structure’, apparently 
utilised by some US companies that market goods and services, particularly throughout 
Europe. The structure involves two parallel Irish companies, one of which is not officially a 
resident in either Ireland or the USA, such that its income is untaxed in either jurisdiction. By 
exploiting weaknesses in the legal definition of a ‘permanent establishment’, the company is 
also able to avoid paying taxes in the countries where the goods and services are being 
marketed and sold (normally a group of European countries).  
                                                          
7 OECD. Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting, p 15. 
8 The Australian Bureau of Statistics has recently released an Information Paper providing estimates of the value 
of imported goods on which GST is not paid because individual transactions fall under the low value threshold. 
For more, see Australian Bureau of Statistics. Measurement of online retail trade in macroeconomic statistics: 
8501.0.55.007. Information paper Canberra, ABS, 2013. 
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This type of avoidance could be countered in a number of different ways, but there would be  
different impacts depending on where the income is taxed. In one scenario, the US could 
change its tax laws, either by modifying its definition of residence, or by tightening its CFC 
rules – either way, the profits that are currently untaxed would be taxed within the US. 
Similarly, Ireland could change its definition of residence so as to tax the profits of the 
company in Ireland. Finally, the European countries in which the goods and services are 
actually sold could also tighten their rules relating to permanent establishments, thereby 
allowing for the taxation of any relevant profits. There may already be some scope for doing 
this under existing laws. If not, international cooperation would be needed to override any 
obstructions currently embedded in DTAs. In any event, the potential for different outcomes 
highlights the array of challenges that must be overcome for these problems to be resolved. 
 
Conclusion 
 
International tax avoidance is now perceived as a problem that must be dealt with as a matter 
of priority. To the extent that reforms are necessary, it is essential that they be carried out 
within a framework of arrangements supported by most countries. If this does not happen, the 
problems will not be resolved and international business will be beset with the problems of 
double taxation and costly compliance. As such, the action plan proposed by the OECD 
appears to provide the best way forward. 
 
Nevertheless, there is considerable scope for countries to do more, either by increased 
enforcement of existing measures, or by modest domestic tax reforms that are consistent with 
existing international protocols, such as the OECD guidelines on transfer pricing or the 
Model Tax Convention. Each country needs to look closely at their existing tax laws and 
collection procedures to see if they are achieving the best possible outcomes within the 
limitations of these existing international protocols.  
 
The process involved in getting multilateral support for changes to international protocols 
will be challenging and potentially protracted. For this reason, the OECD/G20 group charged 
with taking this process forward will need to segment tasks, so that areas of reform where 
achieving an international agreement will be less problematic are not held up by those issues 
where country differences run deep. 
 Hard graft: the G20 and anti-corruption 
 
Hugh Jorgensen1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The annual detrimental cost of corruption on international economic growth and fiscal 
sustainability has been conservatively placed at over US$1 trillion.2 This represents a 
substantial amount of lost potential, in terms of both global public and private investment 
activity. Moreover, as the largest share of the corruption burden generally lies with the 
‘poorest of the global poor’,3 it is difficult to conceive of a truly inclusive G20 agenda that 
does not engage with the problem in some way. As such, corruption has officially been a 
component of the G20 leaders’ agenda since 2009, with three two-year ‘anti-corruption’ 
action plans released since the Seoul summit in 2010. By way of accountability on its action-
plan commitments, the fourth annual ‘monitoring report’ on ‘the individual and collective 
progress made by G20 countries’ in fighting corruption’, prepared by the G20 Anti-
Corruption Working Group (ACWG), is scheduled for release towards the end of Australia’s 
2014 G20 presidency. The fourth monitoring report will provide a summary of the ACWG’s 
work and on progress made in counteracting corruption within and between G20 countries for 
2013-2014. However, as the mandates of the ACWG and the most recent G20 anti-corruption 
action plan are set to expire under Australia’s presidency, leaders at the Brisbane summit will 
have to decide whether to extend the G20’s current approach to anti-corruption, to place its 
anti-corruption objectives on hiatus, or to reformulate its approach to combating corruption.  
 
Accordingly, with its presidential prerogative to oversee the G20’s 2014 agenda, Australia 
will have to form a view on what the G20’s future position on anti-corruption should be. If 
G20 leaders have a clear sense of ownership over their stated objectives for and outcomes on 
anti-corruption, as well as a plan for how the G20 can provide a unique ‘value-add’ to anti-
corruption efforts that other multilateral institutions cannot, then the case for renewing the 
G20’s anti-corruption commitments is strong. On the other hand, if leaders believe the 
ACWG’s work does not meet these requirements, or that its work on anti-corruption is not 
sufficiently complementary to the G20’s core focus on reinvigorating economic growth, then 
renewing the group’s mandate without proper critical appraisal would compound perceptions 
about the G20’s ‘bloated’ agenda.  
 
This paper reviews the G20’s work on anti-corruption. It suggests that given the useful 
contribution that the G20 has made to galvanising pre-existing anti-corruption initiatives 
between 2009-2013,4 there remain key areas where G20 leaders could, , continue to help to 
close the gap between commitment and implementation on anti-corruption. The paper 
concludes with suggestions for how the G20 could better structure its work on anti-
corruption.  
                                                          
1 Research Associate, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 World Bank. Six questions on the cost of corruption with World Bank Institute global governance director 
Daniel Kaufmann. World Bank, April 2004: http://go.worldbank.org/KQH743GKF1. 
3 In the words of Kenneth Clarke, the former British secretary of state for ‘put at its crudest, corruption makes 
poor people poorer,’ see: Kenneth Clarke. Address by the lord chancellor and secretary of state for justice to the 
G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group event. Lancaster House, London, Ministry of Justice, 2012.  
4 For more on this contribution, see: Jason Sharman. G20 effectiveness: be careful what you wish for. In G20 
Monitor: rebutting some misconceptions, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013. 
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A brief history of the G20’s anti-corruption agenda 
 
The G20’s first reference to anti-corruption within a communiqué occurred in 2000, when the 
G20 was still only a forum for finance ministers and central bank governors (it was also only 
the second ever G20 meeting). However, the allusion was really only part of a scattershot 
statement against ‘financial abuse’ that vaguely called for members to ‘strengthen … efforts 
to combat … money laundering, tax evasion and corruption…’, and that ‘looked forward’ to 
a joint paper by the IMF and World Bank on the subject. A similarly abstruse statement was 
made in 2004, with corruption not featuring in another G20 communiqué until 2009. 
 
The omission of corruption from the earlier G20 agenda is not so surprising; between 2000 
and 2003, the anti-corruption community was focused on resolving and ratifying the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption – the first global legally binding anti-corruption 
instrument. In deference to the UN’s universal precedence, the G20 limited itself to other 
more pressing forms of financial abuse, such as money laundering and terrorist financing. 
Nevertheless, while both of these latter forms of criminal activity were subject to 
commendable attention from the G20 after the September 11 terrorist attacks,5 they are, in 
practice, distinct (albeit often interlinked) or ‘post facto’ crimes to corruption – loosely 
defined here as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.’6  
 
As such, the first set of G20 commitments that specifically target corruption can be found in 
the Pittsburgh leaders’ communiqué from September 2009. The commitments reside within 
the ‘framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth’ (FSSBG), a document that has 
increasingly come to be seen as the thematic centrepiece of the G20’s post-crisis economic 
recovery agenda.7 Within the FSSBG, G20 members committed to: 
 
• work with the World Bank’s Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) program to secure the 
return of stolen assets to developing countries; 
• ask the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to help detect and deter the proceeds of 
corruption by prioritising work to strengthen standards on customer due diligence, 
beneficial ownership and transparency; 
• work to increase the transparency of international aid flows by 2010; and 
• adopt and enforce laws against transnational bribery, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, and the UNCAC. 
 
The latter commitment was significant in that it garnered the consent of four G20 members 
(Germany, India, Japan and Saudi Arabia) that had, up to that point, failed to ratify UNCAC, 
as well as five non-OECD members (China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia) that, 
unsurprisingly, had not signed up to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Less compellingly, 
leaders also supported ‘voluntary participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
                                                          
5 For more on the anti-terrorist financing work of the G20 through bodies such as the FATF, see: G20. The G20: 
a history. 2008: www.g20.utoronto.ca/docs/g20history.pdf. 
6 This definition is Transparency International’s, but it has come to gain wide currency among the anti-
corruption community. Transparency International further delineates between ‘according to rule’ and ‘against 
the rule’ corruption, where the former broadly covers the exchange of ‘facilitation’ bribes in return for 
preferential treatment in an otherwise legally established process, while the latter involves bribery in return for 
illicit or explicitly prohibited transactions. For clarity, in this paper, unless otherwise specified, ‘corruption’ 
refers to both ‘according to rule’ and ‘against the rule corruption’. For more on link between money laundering 
and corruption, see: FATF. Laundering the proceeds of corruption. Paris, FATF, July 2011.  
7 Mike Callaghan. Strengthening the core of the G20: clearer objectives, better communication, greater 
transparency and accountability. Sydney, Lowy Institute for International Policy, April 2013. 
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Initiative’ (EITI), which calls for ‘regular public disclosure of payments by extractive 
industries to governments and reconciliation against recorded receipt of those funds by 
governments.’8  
 
However, while the anti-graft policies outlined at Pittsburgh embodied a greater appreciation 
for the negative economic effects of corruption than any previous G20 communiqué, it was 
not until 2010 that leaders’ consciously sought to articulate a link between anti-corruption and 
the FSSBG’s raison d’etre: reinvigorating global economic growth. The establishment of this 
‘link’ occurred in two stages. First, leaders at the Toronto summit in June 2010 identified 
corruption as a threat to ‘the integrity of markets, [that] undermines fair competition, distorts 
resource allocation, destroys public trust and undermines the rule of law.’9 Concomitantly, 
leaders established an ‘Anti-Corruption Working Group’10 and tasked it with delivering 
‘comprehensive recommendations’ to the next leaders’ summit in Seoul on how the G20 
could ‘lead by example’ via ‘practical and valuable contributions’ to the fight against 
corruption. Leaders requested the ACWG to focus on ‘areas that include, but are not limited 
to: 
 
adopting and enforcing strong and effective anti-bribery rules, fighting corruption 
in the public and private sectors, preventing access of corrupt persons to global 
financial systems, cooperation in visa denial, extradition and asset recovery, and 
protecting whistleblowers who stand-up against corruption.’11 
 
Five months later, the ACWG produced a two-year ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan’ that 
was adopted by leaders and included in the annex of the official ‘Seoul summit document.’ 
The introduction to the action plan clarified the link between anti-corruption and the G20’s 
leader-driven objective of achieving strong, sustainable and balanced growth: 
 
‘Corruption is a severe impediment to economic growth … As leaders of major 
trading nations, we have a special responsibility to prevent and tackle 
corruption …’ 12 
 
True to the G20’s now well-established penchant for appropriating architectural terminology, 
the plan rested on ‘three pillars’:13  
 
• establishing a common approach to building an effective global anti-corruption 
regime, the principles of which are enshrined in the provisions of the UNCAC; 
• committing to taking action in high priority areas that affect global economic growth; 
and 
• committing to directly engage with private sector stakeholders in the formation of anti-
corruption policy. 
                                                          
8 G20. Leader's statement: the Pittsburgh summit. 24-25 September 2009: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html, clause 42. 
9 G20. The G20 Toronto summit declaration. 27 June 2010: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-
communique.html, clause 40. 
10 Taking the number of G20 working groups to four, the other three being the ‘Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable, and Balanced Growth,’ ‘Development’ and ‘International Monetary Fund Quota and Governance 
Reform’ working groups. In 2013, the ‘Energy Sustainability’ and ‘Climate Change Financing’ working groups 
were also added to the G20 policy hydra. 
11 G20. The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. 
12 Emphasis added 
13 FATF, Laundering the proceeds of corruption. 
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While the 2012-2013 action plan makes it clear that the G20’s contribution to anti-corruption 
is grounded within UNCAC principles, there is a clear underlying assumption that because of 
the sheer scale of the G20’s global economic footprint, anti-corruption policies implemented 
within the G20 are expected to have positive ‘UNCAC plus’ effects beyond the G20 
economies. As such, the nine areas in which G20 leaders initially elected to ‘lead by 
example’ on anti-corruption are: 
 
• prompt and full ratification of the UNCAC by all G20 members, as well as 
participation in individual reviews of each country’s anti-corruption policies in 
accordance with UNCAC requirements; 
• the criminalisation of bribery of foreign public officials, as well as providing support 
to other international anti-bribery instruments outlined by the OECD and UNCAC; 
• the prevention of corrupt officials from accessing the global financial system, in 
addition to increased cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and 
the implementation of FATF standards for ‘transparency of cross-border wires, 
beneficial ownership, customer due diligence, and due diligence for “politically 
exposed persons;”’ 
• the denial of entry and safe haven to corrupt officials, through bilateral cooperation; 
• the particular promotion of UNCAC provisions related to extradition, mutual legal 
assistance and asset recovery, and the provision of technical assistance on these 
matters where needed; 
• the adoption of measures ‘related to, inter alia, preventing and detecting transfers of 
proceeds of crime’, including the establishment or designation of an appropriate 
authority or agency that can provide international mutual legal assistance on matters 
related to corruption and asset recovery; 
• the preparation and implementation of corruption whistle-blower protection 
legislation by the end of 2012; 
• the establishment of anti-corruption agencies with law enforcement power, replete 
with the necessary independence to fulfill their duties free from undue influence; 
• the promotion of ‘integrity, transparency, accountability and the prevention of 
corruption, in the public sector, including in the management of public finances.’ 
 
The action plan also advocates for greater dialogue with and between international 
organisations so as ‘to encourage that they operate with transparency,’ as well as for greater 
involvement of the private sector in the work of the ACWG.  
 
The G20’s anti-corruption commitments have not fundamentally changed in intent 
throughout the Cannes, Los Cabos and St Petersburg summits, held in 2011, 2012 and 2013 
respectively. However, further details to the G20’s anti-corruption action plans have been 
added at these summits, mostly clarifying how the G20 would seek to realise its objectives in 
the nine areas listed above, and how civil society and the business community were 
encouraged to work with the ACWG. Essentially, the updates called for greater cooperation 
between the designated anti-corruption law enforcement agencies in G20 jurisdictions, and 
the creation and sharing of best-practice guides on fighting corruption. Of particular note, 
though, the Los Cabos summit extended the ACWG’s mandate for an additional two years 
until 2014, and released an updated action plan that, although somewhat longer than the 
original, was substantively a reaffirmation of the commitments outlined in the previous 
version.  
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Despite dedicating eleven clauses to the topic of anti-corruption, the most recent St 
Petersburg leaders’ communiqué offered no discernably unique contribution beyond 
reiterating previous G20 commitments. And although eleven clauses is a distinct increase in 
‘volume’ from the two sentences dedicated at Cannes, that the clauses themselves numbered 
103-113 out of a communiqué total of 114, tends to suggest anti-corruption remained a low-
level priority at St Petersburg. However, St Petersburg did at least see the delivery of a 
‘Strategic Framework for the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group,’ which does attempt to 
demarcate a space for the ACWG that does not involve a duplication of other ongoing global 
anti-corruption work. It also raises the status of the ACWG to that of the G20’s other working 
groups and prioritises implementation of the UNCAC and cooperation with the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery.14  
 
The next section examines the actual impact that the G20’s anti-corruption commitments 
have had on the global movement to stymie corruption. 
 
Achievements, outcomes and problems with the G20’s anti-corruption plan 
 
While the G20 can lay some claim to having contributed to the global anti-corruption 
movement, its work in the area has been mostly incremental, frequently piece-meal, and 
sometimes haphazard. Hence, as has been acknowledged by the G20, its current priority on 
anti-corruption must be to close the gap between the rhetoric and actual implementation of its 
commitments in the Seoul and Los Cabos G20 anti-corruption action plans. Failure to do so 
will undermine the legitimacy of the G20 as an anti-corruption actor and, more damagingly, 
will give further succour to critics looking to paint the G20 as ‘invertebrate, flabby and 
toothless.’15 Yet before offering suggestions on how the G20 can close the rhetoric-
implementation gap in the lead-up to the Brisbane summit, this section offers a review of 
outcomes from the G20’s anti-corruption workplan to date, which could potentially provide a 
platform for future G20 work in the area.  
 
By way of accountability on their anti-corruption commitments, G20 members consented in 
2010 to provide annual individual and collective progress reports on the implementation of 
the anti-corruption action plan. At the time of writing, three self-assessment reports have 
been prepared and released by the ACWG, under the French, Mexican and Russian 
presidencies respectively. The self-assessments contain a summary of ongoing work 
occurring within the ACWG. As the remainder of this section shows, some of the ‘outcomes’ 
listed within the self-assessments justify a continuation of the G20’s work on anti-corruption, 
while a far greater number are of dubious consequence, or simply applaud activities whose 
provenance and responsibility for implementation lies outside of the G20 process. 
 
Examples of useful outcomes from the G20’s anti-corruption work 
 
The G20’s most valuable contribution to the global anti-corruption agenda has been in 
alleviating any ‘silo-mentality’ from compartmentalising anti-corruption initiatives 
undertaken by institutions like the UN, IMF, World Bank, OECD or the FATF. The call for 
greater inter-agency dialogue was a key component of the 2010 action plan, and as the G20’s 
own self-assessment reports show, the aforementioned agencies not only cooperated on 
                                                          
14 G20. St Petersburg strategic framework for the G20 anti-corruption working group. G20, September 2013: 
http://www.g20.org/load/783340260. 
15 Robin Davies. What plot? - rationalising the G20's development agenda. In G20 Monitor: development and 
the G20, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013. 
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providing technical input and assistance to the ACWG, but they have also begun to integrate 
their anti-corruption work with one another in a more collegial way. Indeed, as Jason 
Sharman has noted in an earlier G20 Monitor, galvanising and integrating pre-existing global 
initiatives is something to which the G20 is particularly well-suited; G20 leaders do not have 
to ‘reinvent the wheel’ in order to make a meaningful contribution to global economic 
stability, as their collective political weight can generate a sufficient amount of pressure on 
multilateral bodies to produce results in an accelerated timeframe of ‘weeks or months’, as 
opposed to years or decades.16  
 
For example, spurred on by the political uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region in early 2011, the French and Indonesian co-chairs of the ACWG called 
upon a number of multilateral agencies to work on freezing and/or repatriating the assets of 
corrupt leaders. The FATF immediately commenced work on reconciling its guidance on 
anti-money laundering policy to better encompass the task of exposing funds ‘secreted away’ 
by corrupt governments and ‘politically exposed persons’ (PEPs), while the World Bank and 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC – the designated ‘guardian’ of the UNCAC) 
quickly moved to provide practical assistance and expertise to officials from the MENA 
region on ‘tracing and repatriating the proceeds of corruption held abroad.’17 The near-
immediate impact that G20 leaders had in pressuring tax havens ‘black-listed’ by the OECD 
into implementing internationally agreed tax standards, discussed elsewhere in this Monitor 
by Callaghan and Harris, further points to the unique ‘weight’ that G20 leaders’ can bear in 
exposing irregular financial activity. 
 
However of all the multilateral-body initiatives that the G20 has sought to invigorate, it is the 
UNCAC that has garnered the most attention. Of the four G20 members that had not yet 
ratified the UNCAC, but that committed to do so at Seoul, half remain. India ratified the 
convention in May 2011, thereby setting in train the implementation of UNCAC 
requirements such as: establishing specific anti-corruption law enforcement agencies, 
developing public service codes of conduct and creating more stringent standards for 
procurement.18 Saudi Arabia commenced the process of ratifying the convention in January 
2013, having accepted the recommendations of its own ‘National Anti-corruption 
Commission’ that it had established in May 2011, in line with its G20 commitments.19 
Should the G20 be able to pressure the two recalcitrants, Japan and Germany (a curious 
anomaly, as both regularly feature at the top of ‘least corrupt’ indexes), to ratify the 
convention in the near future, and commence work on fulfilling its requirements, this would 
be a legitimate and commendable ‘win’ for the G20, and its anti-corruption agenda. This 
would also allow the G20 to genuinely ‘lead by example’ on anti-corruption, and speak with 
a unified voice in pressuring the fifty countries that have not yet ratified the convention, to do 
so. 
 
Countries that have ratified the UNCAC have also taken further steps in line with their G20 
commitment to ‘lead by example’ on better fulfilling the obligations and overall intent of the 
                                                          
16 See Sharman, G20 effectiveness: be careful what you wish for. 
17 Ibid; FATF, Laundering the proceeds of corruption, p. 11. 
18 Ministry of External Affairs. India ratify UN conventions against transnational organised crime and 
corruption. Press information bureau, government of India, 13 May 2011: 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=72119. 
19 Transparency International Secretariat. Transparency international says Saudi Arabia's steps toward anti-
corruption treaty a good first move. Transparency International, 31 January 2013: 
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_international_says_saudi_arabias_steps_toward_a
nti_corruption. 
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convention. In line with the UNCAC schedule for undertaking peer-reviewed self-
assessments of progress in implementation of the convention, thirteen G20 countries will 
have completed an in-country review by end-2013, with the remaining four UNCAC 
signatories expected to conclude their first review by end-2014.20 A number of valuable 
pieces of anti-corruption legislation have since been introduced within G20 countries in order 
to redress identified legal gaps, a summary of which are included in the monitoring report 
from 2012.21  
 
The criminalisation of foreign bribery, a core tenet of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
has also received a significant lift courtesy of G20 support. As stated in the 2012 monitoring 
report: 
 
‘By criminalising foreign bribery we show that we are ready to take responsibility 
for the action of our citizens and companies overseas as we do in our own countries. 
Alongside the requirement in UNCAC to criminalise foreign bribery, the Anti-
Bribery Convention … is the benchmark.’ 
 
As indicated earlier, this is particularly striking in that non-OECD countries in China, India, 
Indonesia and Russia have begun to work with the OECD Working Group on Bribery on this 
issue – and on anti-corruption more generally – with Russia fully acceding to the OECD 
convention in April 2012. As per the requirements of the OECD convention, Russia, 
alongside other signatories, must now participate in the OECD Working Group on anti-
bribery’s ‘three-phase’ peer review monitoring system. Phase one and two reviews involve 
the evaluation of the adequacy of a country’s legislative capacity to implement the 
convention, and whether it is applying this legislation effectively, while a phase three review 
focuses on remedying identified gaps in the overall enforcement of the convention. For 
example, as a current phase one participant, Russia must now consider removing or 
modifying legislation that currently incentivises foreign bribery – such as tax deductions for 
foreign bribes, as well as establish legal penalties for companies or individuals that 
participate in foreign bribery. Fifteen G20 countries have undergone phase one and two 
reviews, with a further ten advancing to phase three. As far as non-signatories to the OECD 
convention are concerned, China amended its criminal code in 2011 to make the bribery of 
foreign officials an offence,22 and India has begun the process of passing such legislation.23  
 
The third major ‘value-add’ that the G20 has brought to the global anti-corruption effort, is in 
establishing more effective links between anti-corruption law enforcement agencies within 
G20 jurisdictions. This theoretically eases the path towards exposing and recovering assets 
and funds siphoned off through corruption, as well as enabling the legal sanctioning and 
pursuit of individuals and entities engaging in foreign corruption – outcomes that are positive 
for more than the just the G20 countries. In terms of institutional collaboration, this has 
involved the G20 working with the World Bank’s stolen asset and recovery (StaR) initiative, 
as well as the FATF, to better identify the sources of money laundering operations and 
whether they are linked to corrupt behaviour. The likely adoption by the G20 of an automatic 
                                                          
20 See annex ii of: Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Report 
of the implementation review group on its fourth session. Vienna, United Nations, 27-31 May 2013. 
21 G20. G20 anti-corruption working group monitoring report. Paris, G20, 2012. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Yogima Seth Sharma. No place for India on OECD bribery convention unless it enacts stricter laws at home. 
The Economic Times, 24 May 2013: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-05-
24/news/39502234_1_oecd-bribery-indian-parliament. 
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tax information exchange will further boost the G20’s cross-country cooperation in exposing 
corrupt activity.24  
 
The G20 has also adopted ‘a set of principles’ with a view to denying visa entry and financial 
system access, within G20 countries, to ‘corrupt officials and those who corrupt them.’25 
However, although these principles extend beyond the requirements of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention or the UNCAC, they are yet to have an impact outside of the ‘expert 
panel’ currently tasked with designing a plan for their implementation. Nevertheless, the UK 
and Canada have recently begun to implement some of the most stringent anti-foreign-bribery 
legislation in the world (the UK more-so, but both have outlawed ‘facilitation payments’26) 
and, alongside the US, have moved to combat the payment of bribes to both public and 
private foreign entities, as well as authorise the legal pursuit of any parties involved. These 
three countries, alongside Australia, have also established a joint ‘International Foreign 
Bribery Taskforce’ (IFBT), that allows key anti-corruption law enforcement agencies in each 
country to cooperate on exposing acts of foreign bribery by domestic entities. 27 The IBFT is 
in part an outcome stemming from the G20’s commitment to establish better channels of 
mutual legal assistance with one another in dealing with corruption.28 
 
Problems with the G20’s approach to anti-corruption, and what to do about it 
 
Despite the positive progress outlined above, there are questions as to how uniquely valuable 
the G20’s contribution to anti-corruption actually is, and whether the G20’s anti-corruption 
workplan has been integrated into the G20’s agenda in a sufficiently coherent way, such that 
it does not diminish the forum’s claim to be a ‘leader-driven’ process for confronting 
systemic challenges to stable global economic growth.  
 
For example, a recent Transparency International progress report on enforcing the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention suggests only four of the eleven G20 countries that are party to it 
are actively enforcing their stated obligations.29 In other words, just because the G20 has 
galvanised its members that are not OECD convention signatories into sending participants to 
OECD anti-bribery workgroup meetings, or passing OECD-compliant legislation, does not 
mean anti-corruption laws are actually going to be any more strictly enforced within G20 
countries that suffer from corruption. That Japan and Germany rate so low on Transparency 
International’s corruptions perception index, despite not being signatories to the UNCAC, 
highlights the difficulty of implementing meaningful anti-corruption reform beyond signing 
agreements or conventions. 
 
In addition, a simple investigation of the G20’s own action plans and ACWG monitoring 
reports reveals an ambiguity even in the strength and intent of the G20’s anti-corruption 
commitments, with a number of clauses failing to call for anything more strident than 
                                                          
24 See (this publication): Mike Callaghan and Marty Harris. Reforming international taxation: the role of the 
G20. In G20 Monitor: tax, infrastructure, anti-corruption, energy and the G20, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2013. 
25 G20, G20 anti-corruption working group monitoring report. 
26 Facilitation payments fall within the ‘according to rule’ category of corruption described earlier in footnote 5. 
27 Respectively: the City of London Police’s Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit, the Royal Canadian mounted 
Police, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Australian Federal Police. 
28 See: G20. Requesting mutual legal assistance in criminal matters from G20 countries: a step-by-step guide. 
G20, 2012. 
29 Fritz Heimann and Gillian Dell. Exporting corruption? Country enforcement of the OECD Anti-bribery 
convention progress report 2012. Berlin, Transparency International, 6 September 2012. 
 
 
54 
‘examine the possibility of’, ‘explore areas of overlap in’, ‘propose best practice guides on’, 
‘call for dialogue over’ or ‘welcome voluntary participation in’ whatever (otherwise) noble 
objective is being addressed.30 As has been observed many times within G20 Monitor papers, 
for the G20 to credibly claim to be the ‘premier forum for economic cooperation’ between its 
members, it must actually produce meaningful and tangible outcomes that go beyond writing 
endless reports and commissioning investigations – a requirement that the bulk of limpid 
pronouncements within the G20’s anti-corruption action plans, and in the leaders’ 
declarations, currently do not meet. 
 
There is also the question of how strongly G20 leaders are interested in, or feel they have 
ownership over, the ACWG and the anti-corruption action plans. The G20’s institutional 
comparative advantage is, after all, that it brings together the preeminent political leaders 
from twenty of the world’s most powerful economies. It is doubtful that analysing and honing 
the finer details of domestic anti-corruption legislation within G20 countries is an appropriate 
use of the extremely limited time that G20 leaders’ have together at summits. This 
‘ownership’ problem is compounded in that the G20 anti-corruption self-assessment reports 
are not even necessarily presented to leaders for their review, or even finalised by the time of 
the leaders’ summits. In 2012 the report was presented to sherpas after the Los Cabos 
summit, for example.  
 
In other words, the G20 would likely be more effective as an anti-corruption actor, if it 
undertook to critically appraise its approach to anti-corruption and whether its anti-corruption 
work appropriately reflects the G20’s comparative advantage as a leader-driven process. In 
particular, whether the biennial release of ACWG-prepared anti-corruption action plans, and 
the associated renewal of the ACWG’s mandate, is an approach that maximises the political 
authority of twenty of the world’s most powerful leaders. For example, the anti-corruption 
clauses contained within the recent St Petersburg communiqué are arguably little more than a 
summary of the third monitoring report, and thus reveal little of the ‘breakthrough’ capacity 
that G20 leaders wield. Is it really worth assembling world leaders once a year so they can 
endorse the timid findings of working groups? 
 
If the leaders’ communiqués are to have any clout on any issue, they must become more 
concise and outcome-oriented, and reflect a willingness to confront systemic challenges. 
Sizable roadblocks to fighting anti-corruption, like full ratification of the UNCAC and the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by all G20 members, as well as the implementation of a 
credible ‘denial of entry and safe haven to corrupt persons in G20 countries’ initiative, are 
matters worthy of leaders’ attention, and of being included in the leaders’ agenda for 
Brisbane. A serious commitment to implementing the EITI, that demands more than 
voluntary participation, is another area potentially worth pursuing.  
 
Lower-level ‘policy refinement’ issues, especially those that are now primarily a matter for 
G20 members’ legislatures, are better fitted to the work of sherpas and similarly ranked 
officials or ministers, rather than being forced up to the leaders’ agenda and communiqué. 
However, any potential redistribution of ongoing anti-corruption work to a ‘lower-level’ 
should not be seen as an indication that the relevant issue is no longer of value. Rather, by 
restricting the elevation of anti-corruption measures to the leaders’ agenda to only those 
systemic, deadlock items that are worthy of their limited time, the saliency of anti-corruption 
                                                          
30 A similar point is made by Robin Davies with regards to the G20 and the Development Agenda, in Davies, 
What plot? - rationalising the G20's development agenda. 
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policy within the G20 would hopefully receive a boost, as would the coherency of the G20’s 
overall organisational structure and modus operandi. In the same way, future G20 anti-
corruption action plans should be made more concise and accessible, by ensuring outlined 
commitments are limited to systemic problems that either go beyond, or are not being dealt 
with by other institutions.  
 
As such, the G20 might be best placed to direct the ACWG to more effectively integrate its 
work into the G20’s overall ‘framework for strong sustainable and balanced growth,’ and to 
produce a more limited set of recommendations for submission to the actual leaders’ agenda. 
Indeed, it is unfortunate that there is not more cross-pollination of ideas between the various 
G20 working groups in the first place. By pursuing more collaboration and consultation 
between the G20 streams that have been tasked with pursuing the various components of ‘the 
framework’, the ACWG would likely be able to attain greater clarity of purpose on why its 
objectives were worth pursuing in the overall context of the G20’s agenda, and how they 
could be best pursued.  
 
For example, commitments around exposing money laundering and bringing greater 
transparency to illicit financial flows might be better dealt with at finance ministers’ and 
central bank governors’ meetings, as these matters lie within the purview of financial 
regulators and would benefit from the added financial expertise. The prosecution and 
sanctioning of politically exposed persons and corporate entities that are involved in 
corruption, and the recovery of stolen assets, are areas that would likely benefit from input 
from the development working group, as these are essentially matters of good governance 
and fiscal sustainability. Yet whatever the mode of ‘mainstreaming’ or ‘diffusing’ the G20’s 
corruption-focused responsibilities into the most appropriate G20 work-streams looks like, 
the point is that Australia has an important opportunity and incentive to align anti-corruption 
more effectively with the overall G20 agenda.  
 
Naturally, any decision to ‘mainstream’ anti-corruption within the G20 process should be 
done with care and consideration for ensuring the G20’s work on anti-corruption is not 
diminished. Certainly, the G20’s working groups are not created with the intention of lasting 
until perpetuity (and given they are created to help resolve a global challenge, nor should they 
be). But in so far as the G20 is able to make a unique leader-driven contribution to the global 
anti-corruption agenda, there is a case for the ACWG to retain a place within the G20 
process, so as to ensure the G20’s commitments are being pursued at some level, and to lay 
the groundwork for future anti-corruption action plans. Regardless, The Strategic Framework 
for the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group released in St Petersburg appears to have 
bolstered the ACWG’s status by noting that ‘G20 leaders hereby agree … that the Anti-
Corruption Working Group will have the same status of other G20 working groups.’31 
 
One way to help ensure the anti-corruption work of the ACWG and the G20 as a whole 
remains on track is to make its work program more transparent to, and inclusive of, NGOs 
and business interests who have an interest in engaging with the working group. Essentially, 
working with stakeholders to collectively ensure any ‘mainstreaming’ of anti-corruption work 
in the G20 does not result in the issue being prematurely abandoned, and that the G20 
remains accountable for its commitments on anti-corruption, is essential. Fortunately, The 
Strategic Framework does also suggest a more inclusive-outreach process is at least on the 
agenda for the ACWG. 
                                                          
31 G20. St Petersburg strategic framework for the G20 anti-corruption working group.  
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In short, the G20 has brought value to the anti-corruption agenda. Yet whether it can continue 
to do so will require leaders to push for a more specific and outcome-oriented set of 
objectives, that will have a tangible and meaningful effect within (and preferably beyond) 
G20 countries. The positive contribution that the G20 has made in invigorating its own 
members’ efforts in meeting their UNCAC and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention obligations, 
as well as the potential delivery of a framework for denying visa and financial system access 
to corrupt persons and entities, all indicate that the G20 can play a role in hampering 
corruption. These achievements can also provide a basis for future work. The challenge for 
G20 leaders, officials, business stakeholders and those in the broader global anti-corruption 
community, will be in articulating a clear explanation as to why the political capital of 
leaders is required to pursue new and other ongoing anti-corruption policy objectives, 
specifically within the context of the G20’s already large agenda in bringing about strong, 
sustainable and balanced growth.  
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G20 and global energy governance 
 
Mike Callaghan and Marty Harris  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The global energy environment is changing. Emerging nations are consuming more energy, 
and with this their stake in the global energy market is continuing to grow, and the relative 
energy share of developed nations is continuing to fall. At the same time, concern over 
human-induced climate change is pressing countries to increase energy efficiency and to 
develop and expand renewable sources of energy production. A policy tension appears to 
exist between combating climate change and the current approaches to economic 
development. The governance of the global energy system has an important role to play in 
resolving this issue. 
 
The current arrangements for governing the international energy system are exceedingly 
complex, and in some cases archaic and ineffectual. The G20, due to its political power and 
diverse membership, is in a position to push for increased interconnectedness among the 
various institutions involved in the ‘global energy matrix’, and could play a lead role in 
formulating and driving an overarching vision of the future of global energy. 
 
This paper does three things. First, it briefly outlines ‘the problem’: the dramatic shifts in the 
global energy environment and the lack of institutional capacity to deal with these changes. 
Second, it looks at the possible role the International Energy Agency (IEA), as the most 
advanced and broad energy institution, could play in coordinating any reform effort, as well 
as discussing the possible limitations of that role. Finally, it considers the role of the G20 in 
reforming global energy governance. 
 
The problem 
 
Henry Kissinger, in a speech commemorating the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the 
IEA, stated in 2009 that ‘the energy system is on an unsustainable path, threatening the 
political, economic and social stability necessary for continued world progress.’1 Similarly, 
Neill Hirst and Antony Froggatt, in a joint Chatham House/Grantham Institute report from 
December 2012, noted that:  
 
International energy governance has not kept pace with the emergence of major 
developing nations, with the changing relations between oil producers and 
consumers, with the emergence of climate mitigation as a central energy policy 
issue, and with the technology revolution that is required.2 
 
The source of ‘the problem’ can thus be summarised: dramatic shifts are taking place in the 
realm of energy.  
 
                                                          
1 Henry Kissinger. Speech by Henry Kissinger at the IEA ministerial. Paris, International Energy Agency, 14 
October 2009. 
2 Neil Hirst and Antony Froggatt. The reform of global energy governance. Grantham Institute for Climate 
Change, discussion paper no. 3 London, Imperial College, December 2012. 
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First, the centre of global energy consumption is shifting eastward. As the major Asian 
economies have grown, their relative and net consumption of energy has increased. China is 
now the world’s largest energy consumer, and is set to become the biggest importer in 
coming years. Eighty per cent of world energy growth in 2011 is solely attributable to 
China.3 At the same time, energy demand in Western nations is flat lining: OECD members 
accounted for approximately 60 per cent of total world energy consumption in 1973; it now 
accounts for just over 40 per cent.4 According to the IEA, China, India and the Middle East 
are expected to account for 60 per cent of increased energy demand by 2035.5 The following 
graph shows this predicted growth in demand for energy. 
 
Figure 1: Future growth in energy demand according to the IEA6 
 
 
Second, corresponding with this geographic shift in energy consumption, energy demand is 
expected to increase by one third between now and 2035. Energy-hungry developing nations 
will put pressure on existing supply, possibly fostering geopolitical tension over access to 
energy. 
 
Third, the traditional relationship between energy producers and energy consumers is 
changing. Due to the shale gas revolution, as well as other reforms, US oil imports are 
declining. The IEA predicts that the United States will become a net exporter of energy by 
around 2030.7 At the same time, many of the largest energy producers, particularly in the 
Middle East, are witnessing a rapid increase in their own energy demand, further blurring the 
consumer-producer relationship. 
 
Fourth, ‘energy access’ has emerged as a key theme in international debates on energy. 
Currently, more than a 1.2 billion people do not have access to electricity: increasing access 
                                                          
3 Enerdata. Sluggish growth of world energy demand in 2011. 24 May 2012: 
http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/press-and-publication/publications/2011-g-20-energy-demand-decrease-vs-
china-increase.php. 
4 IEA. Key world energy statistics. Paris, IEA, 2013, p. 30. 
5 IEA. World Energy Outlook 2012. Paris, IEA, 2012. 
6 Mtoe refers to Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent; graph from: IEA. Worldwide engagement for sustainable 
energy strategies: 2012. IEA, 2012: 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/worldwide_engagement.pdf. 
7 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012. 
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to reliable and clean (or cleaner) forms of energy is now a key focus of development policy.8 
This was recognised by Hillary Clinton during her Congressional confirmation hearings for 
the position of Secretary of State in January 2009: 
 
As developing countries address energy poverty, the United States should do all it 
can to promote the adoption of clean energy technology and best practices. The 
full suite of energy sources – oil, gas, coal, nuclear, and all renewables, in tandem 
with conservation and efficiency improvements – will be necessary to meet 
projected global and domestic energy demand over the next 25 years.9 
 
Finally, the threat of climate change, as well as the threat of increased competition over 
limited fossil fuel resources, has resulted in the rise in importance of renewable and lower 
carbon sources of energy. Demand for natural gas is increasing, while much of the world is 
searching for cleaner and more sustainable sources of energy. Climate change mitigation has 
emerged as a central energy policy issue – fossil fuel-based energy production accounts for 
about 70 per cent of all greenhouse gas emissions10 – and the goal of environmental 
sustainability has been described as the single most dramatic shift in the global energy 
landscape in recent decades.11 
 
To summarise the problem, the global energy system, and mechanisms in place to govern it, 
is immensely complex. The variety of energy sources – oil, natural gas, nuclear, coal, 
renewables – each have different trading systems, and mostly have different governing 
bodies. The addition of environmental concerns, and the pursuit of international arrangements 
for managing threats to the environment and to mitigate the impacts of climate change, 
complicates the situation further. A useful simplification of this complexity is provided by 
Cherp, Jewell and Goldthau, who state that current global energy challenges, and the global 
governance arrangements associated with them, can be broken down into three distinct and 
relatively autonomous arenas:  
 
• energy security – ensuring secure access for all nations to reliable sources of energy, 
and being able to cope with energy emergencies; 
• energy access – enabling access to modern forms of energy to the world’s poor; and, 
• climate change – minimising the impact of increased energy consumption on 
ecosystems and the climate.12  
 
‘The problem’ can be readily identified. However ‘the solution’ – how to increase the 
coordination among these three arenas and increase the effectiveness of global energy 
governance – is not straightforward. 
  
                                                          
8 World Bank. Energy overview. World Bank, 26 September 2013: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/energy/overview. 
9 Committee on Foreign Relations. Nomination of Hillary R. Clinton to be secretary of state: hearing before the 
committee on foreign relations, United States Senate, one hundred eleventh congress, first session. Washington, 
DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 13 January 2009. 
10 IPCC. Summary for policymakers. In Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to 
the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by Bert Metz et al. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp 1-23. 
11 Navroz K. Dubash and Ann Florini. Mapping global energy governance. Global Policy 2 2011, pp 6-18. 
12 Aleh Cherp, Jessica Jewell and Andreas Goldthau. Governing global energy: systems, transitions, complexity. 
Global Policy 2 (1) 2011, pp 75-88. 
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How to reform global energy governance? 
 
Some commentators are not convinced that a comprehensive international institution should 
or could be created with the capacity to address the problem – one that could tie together the 
various strands of global energy policy, promote better coordination, and articulate and track 
the implementation of a broad vision for global energy governance. British Prime Minister 
David Cameron, in his 2011 report to the G20 on global governance, argued: 
 
There are a large number of established institutions and processes, 
especially those tackling challenges in cross-cutting areas such as energy, 
the environment and development: the essential challenge is to make these 
institutions work better together. The solution in many cases is not formally 
changing mandates or creating new bodies. Such changes can consume huge 
amounts of political energy. And in today’s fast-changing world, challenges 
often evolve more quickly than institutions can be restructured to address 
them. Rather, existing institutions must be given clearer and stronger 
political direction to work together, analysing global problems and 
proposing actions in a more joined-up way to achieve common goals.13 
 
As noted, there is little support for the creation of a ‘World Energy Organisation’. Due to the 
conflicting interests and goals of many in the energy game, creating such an institution would 
be exceedingly difficult.14 Therefore, the best course of action may involve using the G20’s 
political influence to establish a greater coordinating or linking role for an existing 
international institution. 
 
The International Energy Agency: the only available option 
 
The IEA is by far the most significant and powerful international energy body, and is 
probably the only body currently viewing the energy problem holistically. Initially dedicated 
to responding to physical disruptions in oil supply, it now has a broad agenda. Described as a 
body representing the interests of energy consuming nations (although its members include 
some major energy producers – Canada, the US, Australia and Norway, for example), it has 
six traditional functions:  
 
• coordinating oil emergency preparedness and a collective response to supply 
interruptions – all IEA members are required to hold strategic stocks equivalent to 90 
days worth of oil imports; 
• reporting on short- and medium-term energy market outlooks; 
• acting as an authoritative source for international energy data; 
• coordinating energy policy through discussion, analysis and peer review; 
• managing a network of over 40 technology collaboration networks; and 
• reviewing international energy developments and publishing the authoritative World 
Energy Outlook.15 
 
                                                          
13 David Cameron. Governance for growth: building consensus for the future. London, Prime Minister's Office, 
November 2011, p 9. 
14 Dries Lesage. Global energy governance by the year 2020. Paper presented at the Re-engineering of the 
global governance system seminar, Bellagio Conference Centre, Bellagio, 23-27 November 2009. 
15 This list is based on Hirst and Froggatt, The reform of global energy governance, p 8. 
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The IEA’s role and focus has broadened substantially over the years.16 In its 1993 ‘Shared 
Goals’ agreement, the IEA committed to the three E’s – energy security, economic 
development and environmental protection – and it now describes itself as having four main 
functions relating to: 
 
• energy security – promoting diversity, efficiency and flexibility within all energy 
sectors; 
• economic development – ensuring the stable supply of energy to IEA member 
countries and promoting free markets to foster economic growth and eliminate energy 
poverty; 
• environmental awareness – enhancing international knowledge of options for tackling 
climate change; and 
• engagement worldwide – working closely with non-member countries, especially 
major producers and consumers, to find solutions to shared energy and environmental 
concerns. 
 
Despite its expertise and broad conception of the global energy system, there are hurdles to 
overcome if the IEA is to play a more central role in international energy policy and 
governance. 
 
The Agreement on an International Energy Program – the IEA foundation treaty – explicitly 
restricts full membership to OECD states.17 It cannot, therefore, currently bring China and 
India on board unless they join the OECD. This is a problem, as these countries will provide 
the bulk of future energy demand; China is already the world’s largest energy consumer. 
Allowing those outside the OECD to join the IEA would require treaty amendment, which 
would be difficult and likely take a long time.  
 
Nevertheless, the IEA does have a significant international outreach program, which focuses 
on Russia, China and India. It has signed ‘joint statements’ with each country, which allows 
them to attend a limited number of meetings and take part in a range of collaborative projects. 
It is currently attempting to have Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and 
Indonesia join a formal association with IEA.18 However, efforts to better incorporate 
emerging markets have run into problems in the past.19 
 
Moreover, even if IEA enlargement was likely, its role as a consumer-orientated organisation 
makes it difficult to see how it could effectively include major producers such as Russia and 
Saudi Arabia. The inclusion of major producers would radically change the nature of the 
organisation. And, as Henry Kissinger notes, one of the reasons the IEA has been so 
                                                          
16 For more information on the broadening of the IEA’s agenda and work see: Thijs Van de Graaf and Dries 
Lesage. The International Energy Agency after 35 years: reform needs and institutional adaptability. The Review 
of International Organizations 4 (3) 2009, pp 293-317. 
17 Chapter VII in IEA. Agreement on an international energy program. IEA, 25 September 2008: 
http://www.iea.org/media/aboutus/history/agreementIEA.pdf. 
18 Ajay Makan. IEA toils over emerging market membership. Financial Times, 7 June 2013: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ba2ddba4-cf48-11e2-be7b-
00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2duwWIuX4. 
19 Joint Statement by the Minister of Power, India and the International Energy Agency, signed in Paris, 18 
October 2011; Joint Statement by the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation and the International 
Energy Agency, signed in Paris, 18-19 October 2011; and Joint Statement by the National Energy 
Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the International Energy Agency, signed in Paris, 14 
October 2009. 
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successful is because its members have shared goals and a ‘common vision’.20 Naturally, any 
effort to holistically reform international energy governance, or to craft a broad policy vision 
for the future of the global energy system, would need to have major energy exporters 
centrally involved. Hence, the IEA has a problem. 
 
Despite these significant obstacles, the desire or necessity for IEA reform that goes further 
than the ambitions described above is well recognised. The former US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton noted in 2009 that:  
 
the IEA should be laying the groundwork now for eventual Chinese and Indian 
membership … The IEA was created as an institution that represents the interest 
of the major energy consuming nations. If its membership does not change to 
reflect who those nations are today, its authority and effectiveness will erode. 21  
 
According to Clinton, the inclusion of China and India would enable increased consumer-
nation policy coordination, further the opportunity for agreement on transparency in energy 
markets, enhance the market-stabilising effectiveness of emergency oil stocks (as China and 
India would be required to hold them), and maintain the centrality of the IEA in the 
international energy system. Kissinger similarly argues that ‘the IEA must evolve to 
incorporate those countries that will drive the future of global energy.’22 China and India’s 
full participation in the IEA would increase that organisation’s share of world energy 
consumption to about 63 per cent (from its current total of 45 per cent).23 
 
Another organisation that could possibly act as a leading knowledge centre, as well as 
support any G20 involvement in energy policy, would be the International Energy Forum 
(IEF). France and Venezuela jointly formed the IEF in the 1990s, with the intended purpose 
of fostering dialogue between energy producers and consumers.24 Saudi Arabia financed the 
establishment of a secretariat in Riyadh in 2003, and the IEF now has 89 members.  
 
Its major success was the establishment or coordination of the Joint Oil Data Initiative 
(JODI). JODI was set up in 2005 to ‘build the timely, comprehensive, and sustainable energy 
data provision architecture which is a prerequisite for stable energy commodity markets.’25 
The JODI oil database features information on monthly oil production, consumption, stocks 
and trade from about 90 countries. The G20 has commended JODI and ‘welcomed’ IEF 
efforts at consumer-producer dialogue on a number of occasions.26 The success of the JODI 
oil database has led to a separate database being developed to cover natural gas (‘JODI 
Gas’).27 
                                                          
20 Kissinger, Speech by Henry Kissinger at the IEA ministerial. 
21 Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Hillary R. Clinton to be secretary of state: hearing before the 
committee on foreign relations, United States Senate, one hundred eleventh congress, first session. 
22 Kissinger, Speech by Henry Kissinger at the IEA ministerial. 
23 Anup Rao and Andrew Ludwig. Does the IEA have the energy to compete in the future? International Affairs 
Review, 29 July 2013: http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/485. 
24 IEF. International Energy Forum charter. 22 February 2011: 
http://www.ief.org/_resources/files/content/about-ief/ief-charter.pdf. 
25 JODI. About JODI. JODI, 2013: http://www.jodidata.org/about-jodi.aspx. 
26 G20. The G20 Seoul summit leaders' declaration. 2010. Also see: G20. Cannes summit final declaration - 
building our common future: renewed collective action for the benefit of all. 2011: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-communique-111104-en.html. 
27 For more on the JODI Gas initiative see JODI. Update on JODI-Gas. JODI, 5 June 2013: 
http://www.jodigas.org/update-on-jodi-gas-05-june-2013-web.pdf. 
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The IEF is, however, a relatively new organisation with a small secretariat, and would need to 
quickly expand if it was to play the coordinating role that is required to increase linkages 
between the various multilateral energy institutions. However, this should not preclude the 
IEF from playing a crucial part in discussions relating to the future of energy. Clearly, as the 
leading forum for consumer-producer dialogue, the IEF will play a central role in the future 
of energy governance.  
 
What role can the G20 play? 
 
The G20 includes the largest IEA energy consuming economies: the United States, the major 
EU countries and Japan. While the global share of energy use and imports of these countries 
is in decline, they are, nevertheless, at the forefront of producing renewable energy 
technology. As indicated earlier, the United States is also undergoing a revolution in energy 
production, and is predicted to again become a net exporter of energy in coming years, 
decreasing its dependence on foreign sources of energy. 
 
Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter and a key OPEC member, is also in the G20. 
Saudi Arabia’s membership means that any initiative in reforming energy global governance 
must account for the views of OPEC members. For example, any G20 proposal to expand the 
role of the IEA, particularly in terms of global energy governance, would need Saudi 
Arabia’s support. Likewise, Russia, a G20 member and one of the largest energy producers 
and exporters outside OPEC, and a key natural gas supplier to Europe, will be a key player in 
any moves to reform energy governance. 
 
China and India, the two emerging giants of energy consumption and importation, will 
account for a large chunk of the growth in energy demand in the coming decades, and for a 
large chunk of carbon emissions as well. Any G20 initiative that aims to ensure a sustainable 
energy future must involve India and China. Finally, the G20 economies collectively account 
for the vast majority of global energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, with a 
responsibility for slightly less than 80 per cent of both.28  
 
Finding a way forward through the G20 
 
The diverse membership of the G20 can be seen as having both positive and negative 
implications for the effort to reform global energy governance. On the negative side, because 
the forum contains the largest energy producers and consumers, with a significant gap in 
policy outlook between the two, attempts to drive global energy governance reform within 
the G20 will be difficult. But this diversity also highlights the G20’s potential strength, as its 
composition provides the opportunity to bridge the divide in a way that other forums cannot.  
Moreover, the G20’s inherent strength as a leader level forum is that it has the potential 
political power to drive reform. 
 
The G20 has undertaken to implement a significant number of energy-related commitments. 
The 2009 Pittsburgh summit launched initiatives covering the phasing out of fossil fuel 
subsidies and the promotion of energy market transparency to combat price volatility, and 
drew a link between energy efficiency, encouraging renewable energy technologies and 
                                                          
28 Thijs Van de Graaf and Kirsten Westphal. The G8 and G20 as Global Steering Committees for Energy: 
opportunities and constraints. Global Policy 2 2011, pp 19-30; Dubash and Florini, Mapping Global Energy 
Governance, p 21. 
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combating climate change.29 Work has continued in all these areas. In 2013, Russia 
established a G20 Energy Sustainability Working Group.30 The group’s focus is on building 
up transparency in energy markets, energy efficiency and green growth, and protection of the 
marine environment. 
 
As this paper has outlined, the next initiative for the G20 could be to use its political muscle 
to push for greater linkages between energy-related international institutions, initiate IEA 
reform and to articulate a broad policy vision for international energy governance.  
 
In 2009, the idea was raised of establishing a G20 Task Force on Energy, which could 
provide the political leadership and strategic thinking for the future of global energy 
governance.31 is the proposal was for the G20 to create a permanent high-level body to 
review the global energy challenge and draw together the work of the various concerned 
institutions – the UNFCCC, IEA, World Bank, IAEA, Energy Charter Secretariat, WTO, 
OPEC, International Energy Forum, the IPCC and others. However, this proposal involves 
the establishment of a small G20 secretariat that would likely be located within the IEA in 
Paris. Many G20 members have resisted the idea of establishing any form of permanent 
secretariat for the forum, arguing that such a move would undermine the G20’s fundamental 
strength as a political forum that directly involves political capitals, particularly their leaders.  
 
The G20 should use its ‘political power’ to provide a strong impulse for change in global 
energy governance. It is the only body that can overcome the many problems associated with 
the current complex arrangements governing the international energy system. But it will be 
difficult. Either way, a start has to be made, and the G20 should place a review of global 
energy governance onto its work program for 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 G20. Leader's statement: the Pittsburgh summit.  
30 Russian Presidency of the G20. The Russian presidency of the G20: outline. December 2012: 
http://www.g20.org/docs/g20_russia/outline.  
31 Lesage, Global energy governance by the year 2020. 
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